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U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN "YUGOSLAVIA":
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS, AND LESSONS LEARNED

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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ABSTRACT

U.N. PEACEKEEPING IN "YUGOSLAVIA": BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS,
AND LESSONS LEARNED by MAJ David A. Mosinski, USA,
134 pages.

This study seeks to answer the question: How effective were U.N. peacekeeping operations in the disputed areas of "Yugoslavia" in 1992?

In doing so, the study embraces three themes. First, it explores the causes of the Yugoslav Conflict. Second, it analyzes the peacekeeping operation in terms of change over time--focusing on changes to conditions, objectives, and resources. Finally, it assesses the performance of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on each of its eleven missions.

The study concludes that UNPROFOR was not very effective. Of the eleven missions assigned, it achieved complete success on but one of them, and it failed outright on three. The Serbian Knin authorities and Serbian militia forces were largely to blame.

The U.N. itself made several critical mistakes: failing to identify and address the causes of the conflict, assigning UNPROFOR an impracticable mandate, and failing to achieve a cease-fire over Bosnia-Herzegovina or to gain cooperation between the three sides fighting there.

The study also concludes that if the United States wants the U.N. to be effective in the future, the United States should incorporate peacekeeping into its national security strategy. It should also address shortfalls in both peacekeeping doctrine and training within its armed forces.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in in Europe
EC	European Community
FADURK	Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo
FEC	Federal Executive Council
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers (Sinai)
MNF II	Multinational Force in Beirut II
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
STO	Slovene Territorial Defense Force
TDF	Territorial Defense Forces
U.N.	United Nations
UNCIVPOL	U.N. Civilian Police
UNHCR	U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOC	U.N. Operation in the Congo
UNPA	U.N. Protected Area
UNPROFOR	U.N. Protection Force
UNTAC	U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WEU	Western European Union
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: How effective were U.N. peacekeeping operations in the disputed areas of "Yugoslavia" in 1992? One might readily assume that they were a dismal failure. After all, U.N. peacekeeping forces had conducted operations in this region for over nine months--since March 1992. Yet, at the end of the year, there was still significant fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a former republic of Yugoslavia). Peace appeared to be nowhere in sight.

One cannot, however, look at the peacekeeping operations in such simple terms. The U.N. peacekeeping forces did not deploy to the former Yugoslav republics to stop the sides from fighting. In actuality, they were sent to areas of Croatia (a sovereign successor state from the former Yugoslavia) "to create the conditions for peace and security required for an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."¹ Indeed, with the introduction of U.N. peacekeepers, Croatia did not experience further conventional warfare in 1992. Yet another successor state, Slovenia (which was the site of the initial military

engagements in June 1991), also remained peaceful in 1992. Nevertheless, battles raged throughout the year in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this former republic, the U.N. forces have not actually been conducting peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. Instead, their work could be classified as humanitarian relief efforts.

Peacekeeping and peacemaking operations are not one in the same. These and other terms require explanations before proceeding with an analysis of the U.N. operations in the disputed areas of "Yugoslavia." Here, then, is an enumeration of terms that will be used throughout this thesis:

1. Civil War: In general terms civil wars are conflicts within a state between two or more groups fought because of disagreements over the future of that state. At least one of the groups at war must be a nonstate actor; the other group(s) may be either the state's government or additional nonstate actors. . . . Civil wars occupy a curious place in any typology of wars and violence. On one hand they are often violent. . . . On the other hand civil wars have been defended as the last recourse of action against corrupt, outdated, or unyielding social systems and governments.²

2. Cleavage: A cleavage is a division on the basis of some criteria of individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflict may arise. The concept of a cleavage is thus not identical with the concept of conflict; cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by a conflict. A division of individuals, groups or organizations constitutes a cleavage if there is some probability of a conflict.³

3. Conflict Regulation: the prevention, containment, and management of conflict in such a way that the basic parameters of the system are maintained.⁴

4. Nation: A nation . . . need not necessarily be either geographically bounded or legally defined. A nation is a grouping of people who view themselves as being linked to each other in some manner. A nation is therefore as much a psychological fixation as anything else. Groupings of people who consider themselves to be ethnically, culturally, or linguistically related may thus be considered a nation.⁵

5. National Security Strategy: the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and informational powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during⁶ peace and war, to secure national objectives.

6. Nationalism: Nationalism is an immediate derivative of the concept of nation. It refers to the feelings of attachment to each other which members of a nation have and,⁷ to the sense of pride that a nation has in itself.

7. Peacekeeping (U.N. definition of): the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.⁸

Peacekeeping Operations (U.S. military definition of): military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution of a conflict between the belligerents.

8. Peacemaking (U.N. definition of): action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in¹⁰ Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

Peacemaking Operations (U.S. military definition of): a type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.¹¹

9. Propaganda: information, ideas, or rumors deliberately spread widely to help or harm,¹² a person, group, movement, institution, nation, etc.

10. Sovereignty: supreme and independent power or authority in government¹³ as possessed or claimed by a state or community.

11. State: A state is a geographically bounded entity governed by a central authority that has the ability to make laws, rules, and decisions, and to enforce those laws, rules, and decisions within its boundaries. A state is also a legal entity, recognized under international law as the fundamental decision-making¹⁴ unit of the international legal system.

Before beginning the analysis of U.N. operations in "Yugoslavia," it would be prudent to inspect the background of the Yugoslav Conflict. This background examination will be done in two parts. First, sources of conflict within the former Yugoslavia will be presented. Second, means of conflict regulation available to the former Yugoslav Government will be discussed.

Sources of conflict within the former Yugoslavia fit the pattern of cleavages common to Europe. The political scientist Hans Daalder categorizes the major cleavages in Europe as follows:

1. Class or Sectional Interest: parties representing sections of industry or commerce, labour or agriculture;
2. Religion: modernists, fundamentalists, Catholics, Protestants, clericals, anti-clericals, Anglicans, and non-conformists;
3. Geographical Conflict: town versus country and centre versus periphery;
4. Nationality or Nationalism: ethnic parties and nationalist movements; and
5. Regime: status quo parties, reform parties,¹⁵ revolutionary and counter-revolutionary parties.

These cleavages were all present in the former Yugoslavia. The first one, however, "class or sectional interest," would be more appropriately termed "relative levels of development" or the "economic cleavage" for the Yugoslav case.

The "nationalism cleavage" posed the greatest problem for Yugoslavia. One reason for this was simply the presence of so many nations within this former state: Serbs (36% of the total population in 1989), Croats (19.8%), Muslims (8.9%), Slovenes (7.8%), Albanians (7.7%), Montenegrins (2.6%), Hungarians (1.9%), along with several others.¹⁶ A second reason is that certain nations, generally speaking, held prejudices against certain other nations, as concluded in a 1971 study:

The Croats tend to view the Serbs as expansionistic and arrogant, and the Serbs portray the Croats as passive, timid to the point of cowardice, and inclined to collaborate with (foreign) subversive elements. . . . The Slovenes have a tendency to look down on other Yugoslavs for their inefficiency and allegedly irrational use of resources. The Slovenes themselves are viewed by other Yugoslavs as unsociable, unfriendly, "Germans."¹⁷

Yet a third reason that the "nationalism cleavage" presented difficulties for Yugoslavia was due to its hazardous links to both the "religion cleavage" and the "geographical cleavage." The following two passages illustrate these overlaps:

1. Even today, communist officials continue to complain that Croatians tend to be identified with Catholicity and Serbians with Orthodoxy.

Contrary to what one would expect in a modernizing society, viz., secularization, Yugoslavia experienced a waxing xenophobia and a recrudescence of religious sentiment among the youth in the late 1960s, especially in Slovenia and Croatia. That this tumescent affectivity was associated with a reassertion of nationalist feelings and was, in both instances, centered in Slovenia and Croatia, underlines the closeness of the ethnic-religious relationship.¹⁸

2. Yet five of the six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro) were created around their regional ethnic majorities, and the federal system itself is a creature of the multinational configuration of Yugoslavia. Thus, whether primary or secondary,¹⁹ ethnicity is wedded to regionalism in Yugoslavia.

Also wedded to regionalism (the "geographical cleavage") was another dominant cleavage in Yugoslavia: the "economic cleavage." Essentially, the "economic cleavage" separated the wealthier North (corresponding to an area of the former Habsburg Empire) from the poorer South (an area of the earlier Ottoman Empire). Two tables that provide evidence of this "economic cleavage" are provided in Appendix A (Economic Tables).

On the basis of the North-South "economic cleavage" and the data in Appendix A, the political scientist Pedro Ramet depicts Yugoslavia as a geographical four-box set of its eight federal units (six republics and two provinces).²⁰

	West	East
North	Slovenia	Vojvodina
	Croatia	Serbia
South	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Kosovo
	Montenegro	Macedonia

Mr. Ramet uses this model to explain conflict behavior in the former Yugoslavia's balance-of-power system. His model, however, is flawed for three reasons. First, it does not reflect the true geographical disposition of Yugoslavia's major cleavages. Due to the complex nature of Yugoslavia (especially the fact that elements of some nations are located in republics dominated by other nations), a perfect geographic depiction of the major cleavages is virtually impossible. However, a fairly close representation is given in Appendix B (Diagram of Yugoslavia's Cleavages).

Second, Mr. Ramet fails to take into account the existence of Serbia's "puppets." Vojvodina and Kosovo are actually provinces of the Republic of Serbia, and they have thus been Serbian-aligned. The Republic of Montenegro, historically independent, has also been Serbian-aligned, due to its close cultural affinity with Serbia.

Third, Mr. Ramet fails to emphasize the suppressed nation within Kosovo. Although this province has been directly administered by Serbs, the vast majority of the inhabitants (90.0% in 1989) are actually Albanians.

Hence, a better version of Ramet's four-box set, which takes into account the geographic disposition of cleavages, the Serbian-aligned federal units, and the sizable Albanian population of Kosovo is the following:

	West	East
North	SLOVENIA	*Vojvodina
	CROATIA	*SERBIA
South	BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA	*Kosovo . . . Albanians
		*MONTENEGRO
		MACEDONIA

*denotes Serbian-aligned or controlled federal units.

From this new four-box set, one can clearly see that in the former Yugoslavia's balance-of-power system, the scales were tipped in favor of the Serbian nation. One could call it an out-of-balance, balance-of-power system. In this sensitive political environment, conflict regulation was absolutely critical and very difficult.

Although laden with cleavages, until the fighting of 1991 Yugoslavia had not experienced a major armed conflict since World War II. Apparently, Yugoslavia was quite successful at conflict regulation. For Marshal Tito and Yugoslavia, there was no magical solution for the prevention of conflict. Instead, various measures were developed over the years to meet the challenges posed by the cleavages and by the modernization process. There were three major phases of Yugoslav federalism since World War II: administrative socialism, communal federalism, and the disassembling of the federation.²¹ Each phase brought new means of conflict regulation.

The first phase of Yugoslav federalism, administrative socialism, extended from the end of World War II until the beginning of the 1950s. During this

phase, Tito built two key conflict regulation mechanisms. First and foremost, he established the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) as the official and only party for the state. (The title was later changed, in 1952, to the Yugoslav League of Communists.) This measure had the potential to check the ever-dangerous "nationalism cleavage:"

. . . the Communist party originally hoped to erase all ethnic attachments, not only to the groups as they are currently defined--Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and so forth--²²but also to the South Slav conglomerate.

In essence, under the Constitution of 1946, the federal structure closely resembled the Soviet model. The system was highly centralized. The Communist Party Politburo made all major political decisions for the country, and it controlled the economy.

The second step taken under the leadership of Tito focused on the "economic cleavage." Realizing that the poorer regions were a potential source of discontent, the Belgrade regime designated certain areas as "underdeveloped." These areas were to receive the bulk of new investments and industrialization projects. Aid to the underdeveloped regions eventually evolved into a major federal program (in February 1965): the Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo (FADURK).

Although these two measures held promise for regulating conflict, Tito erred on three counts with regard to the "nationalism cleavage." His first mistake was drawing "bad borders." Tito created six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their formation left segments of certain nations stranded in some other republic as a minority group (Serbs in Croatia, Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Albanians in Macedonia, to name but a few cases). Certainly no perfect borders could have been drawn. However, the ethnic criterion, as opposed to the historic criterion, must take priority when drawing borders if turbulence is to be minimized.²³ Perhaps a better solution to the drawing of borders (leaving democracy aside) would have been to establish a large number of mini-republics that best kept national groups intact. Instead of one Serbia and one Croatia, Tito could have established a number of mini-Serbian republics, mini-Croatian republics, mini-Muslim republics, and so on.

A second mistake made by Tito was the fact that he recognized the Montenegrins as a distinct nationality and created a Montenegrin republic, yet he did not take the same action towards the Albanians. Instead, he left the Albanians under the control of the Serbs.

Yet another mistake made by Tito was allowing Belgrade to be the capital of Yugoslavia. This decision

further tipped the out-of-balance, balance-of-power system in favor of the Serbian nation. Mr. Ramet sums up the issue:

A high proportion of the lower- and middle-ranking civil servants in the federal government are naturally drawn from the Serbian community in the area surrounding Belgrade. Yet, whatever the reasons, the proliferation of Serbs in the federal government adds to the wariness of a non-Serb population that has learned to identify the Belgrade regime with the interests of the Serbian nation. Indeed, it was in the hope of breaking this identification that the proposal was entertained, in the immediate postwar years, to move the federal capital to Sarajevo.²⁴

Designating Sarajevo as the capital might have helped bridge the major cleavages through its central location. However, this potentially advantageous move was not made.

The second phase of Yugoslav federalism, communal federalism, covered the period from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. The Yugoslav League of Communists and the economic aid mechanism were effective in conflict regulation, yet did not overcome the cleavages. The Belgrade regime, with Tito still at the helm, ventured on a new course:

The new course, or second phase, . . . has been called the policy of "four D's": democratization, decentralization, debureaucratization, and deetatization (this last meaning the removal of enterprises and public services from state control and organizing them on the principle of self-management).²⁵

Workers' self-management was introduced in 1950, and local self-government was encouraged in the mid-1950s. The

term "communal federalism" is derived from "communes"--the political units immediately below republics and provinces in Yugoslavia, of which there were about 500. The powers of the communes were increased during this timeframe, at the expense of those of the federal units (the republics and provinces). In terms of conflict regulation, workers' self-management and local self-government became the means to resolve conflicts at the lower political and economic levels:

Jack Fisher, another American social scientist who carried out extensive research in Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, concluded that 'the Yugoslavs attempted to restrict conflict and ensure progress by including mass participation of the country's citizens in both local and administrative organs of their communities and . . . enterprises.'²⁶

The third phase of Yugoslav federalism, the disassembling of the federation, extended from the late 1960s to the end of the 1980s.

After the removal of power of Aleksander Rankovic and a number of his supporters (in 1966) for appearing to threaten development of a self-managerial democracy, new life was given to hopes for democratization, party reform, and the economic reform of 1965, designed to give Yugoslavia's economy²⁷ roles in the world market and international labor.

The disassembling of the federation was embodied in the Constitution of 1974. This document gave tremendous powers to the federal units (the six republics and two provinces) at the expense of the central government.

The new constitution was flawed in a number of ways. For one, it established equal representation of the federal units in the two chambers of the legislature. In the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, the six republics were each allotted 12 seats, and the two provinces were each given 8 seats. In the Federal Chamber, the six republics each received 30 seats, and the two provinces each received 20 seats. No consideration was given to population-size of the federal units. Hence, the republic of Montenegro was grossly overrepresented. As stated earlier, Montenegro was Serbian-aligned, but also historically independent.

Another failing in the new constitution was that it required the agreement of all the federal units (unanimous consent of all republics and provinces) for the passing of amendments. Hence, one single unit could block an amendment desired by all others. Yet another oddity lay in the execution phase of laws passed by the federal legislature, specifically:

. . . the provision that federal statutes and other regulations shall be enforced by agencies of the federal units may entail eight quite different ways of enforcing the same federal statute.²⁸

In essence, the disassembling of the federation meant that there would be continual tension between the central government (responsible for all-Yugoslav policy) and the federal units (with their regional and ethnic interests).

To alleviate tension and prevent conflict, two means came to the fore: the Federal Executive Council (a body elected by the legislature) and Tito.

. . . the Federal Executive Council or FEC, although formally stripped of almost all autonomous decision-making power by the reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s, became a powerful actor in these negotiations by skillfully exploiting its role as "broker" among regional interests. Where milder tactics failed, the FEC was able to force concessions out of recalcitrant regional leaderships by threatening to use its constitutional authority to invoke decisionmaking rules based on a qualified majority instead of a consensus, and thereby to override the objections of one or two republics by adopting essential federal legislation as "temporary measures."²⁹

Along with the FEC, Tito, truly a charismatic leader, played a critical role in keeping the various regional interests in check: "Only Tito's personal authority and ability to intervene in any matter had counterbalanced the centrifugal force of all these (regional) factors."³⁰ In fact, at the 10th Congress of the League of Communists in May 1974, Tito was made President of the League of Communists with no limit on tenure in office. In spite of the importance of Tito and the FEC, the shift in power from the central government to the regional leaderships was not corrected.

To summarize, over the three phases of Yugoslav federalism, six means of conflict regulation came into being: the Yugoslav League of Communists, FADURK, workers' self-management, local self-government, the FEC, and Tito.

However, two of these means (workers' self-management and local self-government) were only tools for lower level governments. The other four means of conflict regulation would be the federal government's keys to keeping the peace in Yugoslavia.

With this background on the sources of conflict and the means available for conflict regulation in the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav Conflict itself and U.N. operations can be addressed. To answer the thesis question (How effective were peacekeeping operations in the disputed areas of "Yugoslavia" in 1992?), the following approach will be used:

In Chapter 2, the Yugoslav Conflict will be presented in a form of case study. Three questions will serve as the basis of this study:

1. What were the immediate causes of the Yugoslav Conflict?
2. What were the key external considerations surrounding the Yugoslav Conflict (i.e., a changed world security situation, the disruption of peace in Europe, the transitioning European security mechanisms, the presence of new actors in Europe, and the position of the United States)?
3. What lessons could past peacekeeping operations in regional conflicts offer to the Yugoslav case?

In Chapter 3, an analysis of U.N. operations in "Yugoslavia," in terms of change over time, will be conducted. Four questions will form the framework of this analysis:

1. Where did the U.N. decision to use peacekeeping forces fit in the escalation of events?
2. With what conditions, objectives, and resources did the U.N. peacekeepers begin?
3. How did the conditions, objectives, and resources change over time?
4. What roles did the United States--the lone remaining superpower--play in both the unfolding of the conflict and in the U.N.'s actions on it?

Then, in Chapter 4, lessons will be drawn from this peculiar case. The following questions will form the focus for this chapter:

1. In what ways were the U.N. peacekeepers successful and unsuccessful in 1992?
2. What lessons can be drawn from the Yugoslav case for future peacekeeping operations in regional/ethnic conflict environments?
3. What lessons can be drawn for the United States in dealing with similar situations in the post-Cold War world?

Should these numerous subordinate questions be satisfied, then the thesis question would be answered and perhaps a service could be rendered for future peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER 2

CASE STUDY: YUGOSLAV CONFLICT SITUATION

The Yugoslav Conflict is a peculiar case: as discussed in Chapter 1, Yugoslavia was a state laden with cleavages. The "nationalism cleavage" and the "economic cleavage" proved to be especially volatile sources of conflict. On several occasions--namely, the Slovene Road-building Crisis of 1968-69, the Croatian Crisis of 1971, and the Kosovo Riots of 1981--those two cleavages brought Yugoslavia to the brink of disaster. On each occasion, however, the regime in power was able to use some combination of conflict regulation means to resolve the crisis. As explained earlier, the primary federal tools for conflict regulation were the following: the Yugoslav League of Communists, FADURK, the FEC, and Tito. One would wonder, then, why the crisis of 1991 broke out and turned into a violent end for Yugoslavia.

What were the immediate causes of the Yugoslav Conflict? This question is extremely important.

. . . one of the most dangerous fallacies in the study of war is the belief that the causes of a war and the events of a war belong to separate compartments and reflect completely different principles. This fallacy, translated into medicine,

would require the causes and course of an illness to be diagnosed on quite different principles.

Hence, in this study of U.N. operations and related events in the Yugoslav Conflict, the causes behind the conflict will be diagnosed as well.

In the 1980s, the means available to Yugoslavia's federal government for conflict regulation were weaker than at any time since 1945. Tito had passed away in 1980. The FADURK program ceased to be credible:

As late as August 1982, FADURK had not met its commitments for 1980, let alone for 1981 or 1982. Most of the republics had not--as of August 1982--taken any action to assume certain debts of Kosovo, as urged by the federal government, and certain federal units had failed to make their contributions to FADURK.²

Power in the Yugoslav League of Communists had already shifted from the central to the regional leaderships. The regional leaderships sought regional mandates and, of course, had regional (ethnic) priorities. This meant trouble for the Yugoslav League of Communists:

The tenth session (October 1983) appears to have been a turning point in the life of the party. It revealed publicly the depth and bitterness of divisions in the leadership--divisions that perhaps grew even deeper as the result of the extensive press coverage that followed--and the inability of party leaders to come to any substantive agreement. By June 1984, at the thirteenth session of the central committee, that inability had turned to paralysis.³

Since party support had provided legitimacy to the FEC in its conflict regulation role, it, too, was weakened. With such grave deficiencies in conflict regulation

resources, another flare-up from the "nationalism cleavage" and/or the "economic cleavage" could prove fatal. In the aftermath of the quelling of the Kosovo Riots of 1981, Serbian nationalism took on new inspiration. Slobodan Milosevic, who became Chairman of the Belgrade Communists in 1984 and President of the Republic of Serbia in 1987, took advantage of this revived nationalist sentiment:

The demonstrations in Kosovo after Tito's death for the elevation of the province to the status of a republic proved, although the movement was suppressed, to be the fuse to the powderkeg of long-repressed Serbian nationalist feeling. The new Serbian strong man, Slobodan Milosevic, unscrupulously manipulated the injured national pride of the majority and has been carried along on a tide of public approval and enthusiasm.

Economic grievances began to kindle nationalism across the board in Yugoslavia around 1989, and most of these grievances were instigated by nationalists. Due to a major decline in external resources, as well as economic mismanagement on the part of federal officials and various other factors, Yugoslavia's economy had begun to slide back in 1981. The deteriorating economic conditions throughout the 1980s were characterized by rising inflation and sinking productivity. In December 1988, Branko Mikulic, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, stepped down because of failed attempts to revive the economy.

The worsening economic conditions first ignited nationalist sentiment in Kosovo, where the Albanians began to publicly protest their plight in early 1989. Just

as in 1981, however, the Yugoslav League of Communists and the Serbian authorities of Kosovo declared a state of emergency, in March 1989. Measures consisted of a ban on travel and public gatherings, pressure on some 40,000 Albanians to go to their places of work, and the presence of the special police and the military. There was a wave of arrests among Albanian politicians, intellectuals, and business managers: during two weeks in April, 674 Albanians were taken into custody, and 552 received sentences. There were also intimidation attempts and murder threats directed against Albanian officials and their families.⁵ In spite of this pressure, some Albanians proceeded to stage demonstrations, strikes, and school boycotts from time to time.

Later that same year (1989), Serbian nationalists initiated an economic war between certain republics, which plunged the state into economic ruins. The economic war began on 1 December 1989. On this date, Serbia officially proclaimed an economic blockade against Slovenia. Serbia took this action in reprisal for Slovenia's earlier prohibition of a Serbian demonstration within Slovenia. Additionally, the "Socialist Alliance" of Serbia called on Serbian firms to immediately break all contacts with any Slovenian partners. Within a month, 229 Serbian firms complied with this appeal.⁶ In retaliation, Slovenia threatened to stop all of its payments to FADURK. Further

escalations occurred in 1990, such as Serbia's introduction of a 50 per cent tax on all Slovenian and Croatian goods, and Slovenia's and Croatia's taxation of certain Serbian goods and assets within their republics.⁷

Various grievances soon surfaced among Slovenes. First and foremost, the Slovenes wanted political pluralism and a market economy, as opposed to the existing state-owned economy. Other demands were raised by Slovenian party delegates at the XIV Party Congress held in January 1990: the abolishment of the principle of democratic socialism, the termination of trials for political crimes, the guaranteeing of human rights for the Albanians of Kosovo, greater independence for the republics, and the removal of the economic blockade against Slovenia.⁸ When these demands were overruled by the Serbian-dominated majority, the Slovenes walked out of the Congress. This action brought in its wake the dissolution of the Yugoslav League of Communists over the next few months.

Throughout 1990, as the republics held their first freely contested elections, new parties were created in the republics. Most of the new parties were organized along nationalist lines. In April 1990, the "Democratic Opposition of Slovenia" (a coalition of non-communist groups) won an absolute majority in elections in Slovenia. Also in April 1990, the "Croatian Democratic Community" won the elections in Croatia. This party was a proponent

of Croatian independence. In November 1990, the Macedonian Nationalists (VMRO) surprisingly won the elections in Macedonia, defeating the former communists and the party of the Albanian minority. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where parties having mixed ethnic representation could have been most feasibly formed, nationalist parties instead predominated. In the November elections, the Muslim party won 86 seats, the Serbian party 70, and the Croatian party 45. Finally, in Serbia and Montenegro, the former communist power-holders (now calling themselves socialists) were runaway victors.⁹ In essence, due to economic woes and the disintegration of the Yugoslav League of Communists, nationalism reared its ugly head in most regions and gained legitimacy through the free elections.

Nationalism spiraled throughout 1990 and 1991, and the problem of "bad borders" resurfaced to aggravate the situation. As explained in Chapter 1, Tito had erred and left segments of some nations stranded in a republic dominated by some other nation. In the republic of Croatia, where the party advocating Croatian national independence had won the April 1990 elections, the stranded Serbian minority decided to take action to preserve its interests. In a public referendum in August 1990, 600,000 Serbs voted for the autonomy of their territory (Krajina) within Croatia. They were spurred on by their own leaders and by propaganda from Belgrade. In August and September

1990, they erected and manned street blockades in order to control access into this territory. Several times they also demolished railway lines for the same purpose. Repeatedly, Krajina-Serbs raided Croatian police stations and stole weapons. Weapons were brought in from Serbia as well. Likewise, Croatian officials were arming Croats in the vicinity of Krajina. In late September 1990, Croatian special police went through Krajina-Serbian communities and forcibly confiscated weapons.¹⁰ Newspapers within Serbia called this action "state terror against the Serbian people."¹¹ On 1 October 1990, the mayor of Knin officially announced the "autonomy" of Krajina.

The power struggle over this Serbian enclave continued, and violence here intensified. On 31 March 1991, firefights occurred in Krajina between armed Serbs and Croatian reserve policemen. On 2 May 1991, there were clashes again between Serbian irregulars and Croatian police forces. 16 people were killed in this incident. Then, on 12 May 1991, the Serbs of Krajina held yet another referendum and voted for a political union with Serbia and Montenegro, even though Krajina does not border either of these two republics.

Spiraling nationalism soon turned into a secession crisis. The rotation of the position of President within the Yugoslav Presidency (an 8-member body) failed to occur as scheduled on 15 May 1991. After his one-year term

as President, the Serb Borisav Jovic was supposed to relinquish his position to the Croat Stipe Mesic. However, in the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Presidency, Mesic did not receive the required majority of votes. By this time, paralysis had set in throughout the entire Yugoslav federal system. On 25 June 1991, the parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia finally declared independence from Yugoslavia.

Immediately after these declarations, the Serbian-dominated remnants of the Yugoslav Parliament called on the military to end the crisis: the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA). According to the Constitution of 1974, the YPA was responsible for protecting the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social order of Yugoslavia. It must be noted, however, that a majority of the officer and noncommissioned officers were Serbs and Montenegrins.¹² The YPA attempted to secure the Slovenian borders with Italy, Austria, and Hungary. The Slovene Territorial Defense Force (STO), which the Slovene government had recently reorganized and strengthened, resisted.¹³ This armed conflict marked the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia. After Slovenia, the conflict shifted to Croatia, then to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

There was practically no chance of successful conflict regulation in this secession crisis of 1991 because previously available mechanisms were practically nonexistent. Nonetheless, there were limited attempts

to regulate the conflict. For example, on 12 October 1990, about the time when the Serbs of Krajina were proclaiming their autonomy, Slovenian and Croatian leaders presented a proposal to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation, a loose alliance of individual sovereign states. This idea, however, was firmly rejected by Serbian leaders. Also, on 9 January 1991, as tensions were rising in the Krajina region, the Yugoslav Presidency ordered the disarming of all non-military and non-official groups--with the intent of preventing conflict in Krajina. However, neither the Croats nor the Serbs of this region supported enforcement of the order.

To summarize, there were five immediate causes of the Yugoslav Conflict:

1. Grievances rooted in the "nationalism cleavage" and the "economic cleavage," worsened by Serbia's initiation of an economic war, fueled rising nationalism among five nations: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Muslims, and Albanians.
2. By 1991, there were no conflict regulation means available to the Yugoslav Government: no credible supra-national institution or authority within Yugoslavia.
3. There was a dangerous combination of "bad borders"--Krajina--and propaganda being fed into this region by external nationalists, i.e., the Serbian nationalists in Belgrade.
4. Serbian nationalists used the military instrument to protect their interests.
5. The state's monopoly on violence collapsed with the creation and strengthening of militias in Slovenia and Croatia.

Having diagnosed the immediate causes of the Yugoslav Conflict and gained the understanding that internal conflict regulation means within Yugoslavia were practically nonexistent, it would follow to examine the influence that the external environment had on this volatile situation. What were the key external factors during the Yugoslav Conflict?

Perhaps the most important external consideration was the world's security situation. From World War II until the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the international system was characterized as a bipolar world: a balance-of-power system between the Soviet-dominated East and the U.S.-dominated West. Although new power centers emerged on the world scene in the 1970s--specifically Japan, Europe, and China--none of these new power centers rivaled the United States or the Soviet Union in military capabilities.¹⁴ One could argue that the world was becoming multipolar, yet the bipolarity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (the Cold War) still dominated in Europe. This great bipolarity actually worked to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict in Europe:

The old world order provided a stability of sorts. The Cold War exacerbated a number of Third World conflicts, but economic conflicts among the United States, Europe and Japan were dampened by common concerns about the Soviet military threat. Bitter ethnic divisions were kept under a tight lid by the Soviet presence in eastern Europe.¹⁵

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold

War, and the reform of the Soviet Union, the lid over Eastern Europe was lifted. Moreover, the United States stood as the lone remaining superpower. As such, the U.S. could now command more influence in resolving crises in the "New World Order."

A second important external consideration was that the Yugoslav Conflict meant the disruption of 46 years of peace in Europe. Certainly peace had been placed in jeopardy on previous occasions: Hungary in 1956, Berlin in 1961, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1970. Although three of these instances saw casualties, their level of violence pales in comparison to that of Yugoslavia. In 18 months of fighting (late June 1991 to late December 1992), Yugoslavia yielded some 27,000 fatalities and two million homeless, not to mention the countless destroyed towns of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁶ Hence, "Yugoslavia is the first test of the post-Cold War security order in Europe."¹⁷

The third external consideration was that the European security mechanisms being tested, were, for the most part, in the midst of transition. The Warsaw Pact, of course, was gone. NATO's role was undergoing examination and modification:

The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in November 1991. The threat of a massive, full-scale Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's strategy during the Cold War, had disappeared after

the end of the political division in Europe. The alliance realized that the risks to its security, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and acts of terrorism and sabotage, were now less predictable and beyond the focus of traditional concerns. The new strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered more on crisis management and conflict prevention.

. . . To ensure effectiveness at reduced levels, alliance forces will be increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies. Forces will be organized for flexible buildup to respond to aggression and crises. Collective defense arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces within the integrated military structure.

The European Community (EC) was in transition as well. Throughout 1992, member states were deciding whether or not to ratify the Maastricht Treaty: a treaty which envisions a united position for EC states on both defense and foreign policy matters, in addition to the common currency. Currently, the Western European Union (WEU), composed of nine EC states, is in a subordinate position to NATO (with regard to the security and defense of Western Europe). Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, however, would increase the role of the WEU. Also, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), whose main aim is to develop friendly relations and co-operation between participants in order to lessen the likelihood of military confrontation and promote disarmament, has been widening its membership and attempting to take on a greater role in conflict regulation.

A fourth external consideration is the presence of new actors in Europe. Out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union came three independent Baltic states and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Due to the vast number of ethnic groups in the former Soviet Union and the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in certain areas (in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the Georgia-Russia border area, in Moldova, and in Tajikistan), some analysts view the former Soviet Union as a potential grand-scale Yugoslavia. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, three former republics were recognized as states in 1992: Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A fifth and final external consideration was the political scene in the United States--now the world's lone superpower. The United States had victoriously concluded a major conventional war, the Gulf War, in March 1991. Hostilities broke out in Slovenia in June 1991. After bringing soldiers back home from the Gulf War, it would have been extremely unpopular to send them back to another war, especially to one filled with ambushes, raids, and sniper activities reminiscent of the Vietnam environment. As it went, in 1991, Yugoslavia was viewed as a European concern. The U.S. was more concerned with the Middle East Peace Talks. Then, in 1992, the political scene in the United States was dominated by the election campaigns. President Bush surely had to consider the

impact that American casualties from any military involvement in the Yugoslav Conflict could have had on the course of his campaign. Additionally, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with Russia were on the American political agenda in 1992. It is conceivable that American military intervention in the Yugoslav Conflict could have adversely affected these negotiations, due to Russian sympathies with Serbia.

Hence, internal conflict regulation means within Yugoslavia were practically nonexistent, and external security mechanisms in Europe (NATO, EC, CSCE) were in transition and inconsequential. Could peacekeeping operations (U.N. or regional) along with peacemaking efforts (negotiations) help to restore the peace? What lessons could past peacekeeping operations in similar situations lend to the Yugoslav case? Two U.S.-involved peacekeeping operations in which the regional conflicts had similarly stemmed from "nationalism cleavages" may provide some insights.

The first case is that of the Sinai. In 1979, President Carter had guaranteed to Egypt and Israel that the United States was "prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force" in the event that the U.N. Security Council could not.¹⁹ In April 1982, the United States led a 2,000-man multinational

force (ten states participating) that included three American units. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai proved to be successful for several reasons:

1. The MFO's leaders were extremely competent.
2. Egypt was willing to grant the MFO sufficient freedom of movement to fulfill its responsibilities.
3. There was solid support from the ten participating countries, particularly from the United States.
4. Egypt and Israel wanted²⁰ the MFO to succeed because they wanted peace.

The second case is that of Lebanon. In 1982, President Reagan twice sent the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit to Beirut. In the second instance, it joined 2,200 French and Italian soldiers to form Multinational Force in Beirut II (MNF II). The purpose of MNF II was to allow the Lebanese Government to restore internal security in Beirut, bring an end to violence, and create conditions conducive to the withdrawal of all foreign forces.²¹ In sharp contrast to the success of the MFO in the Sinai, the MNF II operation ended in failure. The failure occurred for several reasons:

1. First, the former unwritten understanding between the warring factions in Beirut on the one side and MNF II on the other had been dissipated to a great degree by late summer 1983.
2. Second, the mandate for MNF II, at least for the U.S. element, had seemingly been enlarged and a change in perception of the U.S. role as a peace-keeper had occurred.

3. Third, the broad political consensus, including the passive acquiescence of the Soviet Union, Syria and others, which had marked the inception of MNF II had also been, for the most part, dissipated after the signing of the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement on May 17, 1983.

4. Fourth, a high degree of freedom of movement--an essential element for a successful peacekeeping operation--proved impossible after the October 23 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and French MNF elements.

5. Finally, poor security and the bad luck of the U.S. Marines played a role in the success of the October 23 terrorist attack which helped substantially to undermine U.S. Congressional and public support for a continued U.S. presence in MNF II.

With such lessons learned from the Sinai and especially Lebanon, would the United States participate in a peacekeeping operation in the disputed areas of "Yugoslavia?" Could any peacekeeping operation here be effective?

CHAPTER 3

PEACEKEEPING ANALYSIS: CHANGE OVER TIME

To date, the United States has shown restraint with regard to the commitment of ground forces to the peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. However, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the United States has played a major role in the U.N. decision-making process throughout the Yugoslav Conflict. This process, of course, was in effect well before the first U.N. peacekeepers arrived in the former Yugoslavia.

Where did the U.N.'s decision to use peacekeeping forces, made on 21 February 1992, fit in the evolution of the Yugoslav Conflict? In answering this question, three phases of the conflict shall be distinguished:

1. Slovenian Phase: 25 June 1991 to 19 July 1991. On 25 June 1991, the parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia each declared the independence of their republics. Shortly after these declarations, the remainder of the Yugoslav Parliament, now without Slovenian and Croatian representation, called on the YPA to end the crisis and restore the territorial integrity of the state. The YPA then attempted to secure the Yugoslav borders (in Slovenia)

with Italy, Austria, and Hungary as well as the international airport in Ljubljana (the capital of Slovenia). The YPA, however, was met by effective resistance from the STO, which executed its doctrine of partisan warfare:

That doctrine involved the avoidance of frontal war, relying instead on guerrilla tactics in situations of military advantage and [on] publicity. To carry out the purely military parts of this strategy, Slovenia mobilized 37,000 out of the 70,000 troops that were available to it. In action, the emphasis was on conducting operations where [enemy] tanks and armoured vehicles could not be used quickly. Thus, such vehicles would find themselves trapped along a mountain road.

Approximately 100 lives were lost in these clashes. On 19 July 1991, the Yugoslav Presidency called for the withdrawal of the YPA from Slovenia. The EC and the international community had placed some pressure on the leadership in Belgrade to help effect this withdrawal. However, it is also likely that the YPA leaders realized that they could not maintain the territorial integrity of all of "Yugoslavia." What they could do, however, was to maintain control over all of the Serbian-populated areas.

2. Croatian Phase: 2 August 1991 to 3 January 1992. On 2 August 1991, the YPA conducted operations to secure control over portions of Croatia: Krajina, Slavonia, and other areas with Serbian populations. Serbian irregulars joined the fight as well. Within the

first 24 hours, there were several hundred casualties. Through this action, the Yugoslav Conflict now ceased to be a border war and became a civil war--a war between the Serbs and Croats. The Slovenes did not fight on the side of the Croats, as the Croats had not aided the Slovenes in their earlier engagements with the YPA. Although the EC, the CSCE, the U.N., and others from the international community engaged in peacemaking efforts to resolve the conflict, cease-fire after cease-fire broke down. By year's end, there were at least 6,000 dead and 15,000 injured.² Fighting between Serbs and Croats finally diminished, though never completely ended, after the U.N. managed to negotiate another cease-fire on 3 January 1992, the fifteenth cease-fire up to that point. Peacemaking efforts were to continue in order to reach a political settlement.

3. Bosnian Phase: 3 March 1992 to the present. On 3 March 1992, Serbian irregulars initiated hostilities within Bosnia-Herzegovina. They did so out of dissatisfaction over the results of a referendum pertaining to its independence from "Yugoslavia." The EC had encouraged Bosnians to hold this referendum. Predictably, Muslims and Croats, who together made up 68% of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, voted in favor of independence as opposed to remaining in a "Yugoslavia" dominated by Serbs. Arguably, these hostilities were a continuation

of the civil war in a new theater. In this phase, Serbs have been fighting against Croats and Muslims, and on occasion, elements of these two latter nations have clashed with each other.

However, there is some merit to another interpretation:

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a 'civil war' or 'ethnic conflict' as many Western observers falsely assert. It was carefully planned by the top political and military leadership in Belgrade. The former federal army troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina were reorganized and reinforced with other units withdrawn from Slovenia and Croatia. . . . The main aim of the redeployments and reorganization of the federal troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to ensure military control of that republic. The former federal army was apparently determined not to be forced to leave the territory of yet another republic of the former Yugoslavia. The army, while professing to act to prevent inter-ethnic clashes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was covertly providing large quantities of arms to the local Serbian para-military forces. Thus, the stage was set for the Serbian attempt to seize some 70 per cent of Bosnian territory, even though the local Serbs made up only about 31 per cent of the population.

These percentages are actually misleading, since most Bosnian Serbs lived in rural areas, while most Bosnian Muslims resided in cities and towns. Also, while it may be true that the political and military leadership in Belgrade has been involved in directing the operations of the YPA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their involvement does not preclude the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling into the category of a "civil war" or "ethnic conflict." In any event, the Bosnian Phase of the Yugoslav

Conflict has yielded enormous casualties. The Health Ministry in Sarajevo lists over 17,000 killed, 111,000 missing, and more than 134,000 wounded from the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴ Sarajevo, the capital, is a city in ruins.

So where did the U.N. decision to use peacekeeping forces fit in this shifting Yugoslav Conflict? This decision actually took place between the Croatian Phase and the Bosnian Phase, when the Security Council adopted resolution 743 (1992):

The Security Council on 21 February established a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.⁵

Throughout the Slovenian Phase and the intense initial fighting of the Croatian Phase of the Yugoslav Conflict, the United Nations took little action. Finally, in late September 1991, the Security Council met at the request of Austria, Canada, and Hungary to discuss the "deteriorating situation" in Yugoslavia.⁶ On 25 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 713 (1991). This resolution urged the conflicting parties to abide by recent cease-fire agreements, and it appealed to them to reach a peaceful settlement through negotiation at the Conference on Yugoslavia, to be sponsored by the EC. Also, this resolution decided that all states should implement an

embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.

However, Yugoslavia was not the same Yugoslavia of old. Slovenia and Croatia had declared their independence three months earlier, though were not yet recognized by the international community. Serbian leaders had allowed the YPA to use force to secure control over the Serbian-populated areas of Croatia. Instead of the course taken, the U.N. could have recognized Slovenia and Croatia as states and could have directed the embargo only at Serbia and Montenegro, since they were clearly the first to resort to violence and were owners of a far superior military instrument. On the one hand, one can argue that the local Serbian populace within Croatia had the right to defend its interests, and that the Yugoslav Government had the right to maintain territorial integrity and social order. On the other hand, one can argue that the Yugoslav Government was unwilling to negotiate on the proposal for a confederation, and that the Yugoslav Government was using the YPA to protect Serbian interests and only Serbian citizens at the expense of other citizens.

The United Nations finally got on track through the appointment of Cyrus Vance, on 8 October 1991, as the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy to "Yugoslavia." Mr. Vance undertook numerous missions to Belgrade and Zagreb (Croatia's capital) and helped achieve the Geneva

Agreement of 23 November 1991, the first key cease-fire agreement, but the fourteenth to date. It was signed by the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia, and by the Secretary of State for National Defense of Yugoslavia.

In addition to calling for a cease-fire, the Agreement provided for the immediate lifting by Croatia of its blockade of all Yugoslav National Army (JNA) [YPA] barracks and installations, and the immediate withdrawal from Croatia of those blockaded personnel and their equipment. It also aimed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to persons affected by the conflict. It was estimated that there were more than 600,000 persons displaced by the conflict.

A critical event took place three days later. "On 26 November, the Council President received a letter (S/23240) from Yugoslavia asking for a peace-keeping operation in that country."⁸ Mr. Vance then developed a plan for a peacekeeping force.

However, the key 23 November cease-fire did not hold, thus complicating Mr. Vance's efforts. On 11 December 1991, the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, deemed that the situation in "Yugoslavia" was worsening. Conditions were not yet conducive to a peacekeeping operation. On 15 December 1991, the Security Council echoed the Secretary-General's assessment.⁹

Nevertheless, on that date (15 December 1991), the Security Council placed Mr. Vance's plan into motion by adopting resolution 724 (1991). Shortly thereafter, on 2 January 1992, Mr. Vance was able to negotiate the

second key cease-fire (the fifteenth overall), this time in Sarajevo. On 8 January 1992, the Security Council, through resolution 727 (1992), approved of this latest cease-fire and the sending of an advance force to "Yugoslavia." Various objections were raised and overcome throughout January, and the Security Council eventually passed resolution 743 (1992) on 21 February 1992, which established UNPROFOR.

In answer, then, to the question of the timing of the peacekeeping decision, UNPROFOR came into being between the Croatian Phase and the Bosnian Phase of the Yugoslav Conflict. It is important to note that UNPROFOR only became a reality after a credible cease-fire agreement had been reached concerning the fighting over areas of Croatia. For both his peacemaking efforts and the inception of UNPROFOR, Mr. Vance deserves great credit.

With what conditions, objectives, and resources did UNPROFOR start out? At the time UNPROFOR was established on 21 February 1992, there were at least six key conditions--mostly favorable. For one, the cease-fire agreement of 2 January 1992 was in effect. Second, the parties to the conflict had agreed to ensure the safety of UNPROFOR, as well as the European Community Monitoring Mission sent earlier to Slovenia. Third, the U.N. had asked all states to provide appropriate support to UNPROFOR, especially to facilitate the transit of UNPROFOR

personnel and equipment through countries bordering the former Yugoslavia. Fourth, the following UNPROFOR sites were designated: the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, sub-offices in Belgrade and Zagreb, and a logistics-base in Banja Luka (a town of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Fifth and perhaps most importantly, three U.N. Protected Areas (UNPAs)--areas of Croatia--divided into four sectors were established: sector E (Eastern Slavonia, including areas known as Baranja and Western Srem); sector N (the northern part of the Krajina UNPA); sector S (the southern part of the Krajina UNPA); and, sector W (Western Slavonia). Sectors are shown in Appendix C (UNPROFOR Deployments as of July 1992). These four sectors would be the areas where UNPROFOR would conduct peacekeeping operations. The sixth and last key condition was that UNPROFOR would remain under U.N. command, vested in the Secretary-General under the Security Council's authority.¹⁰

When UNPROFOR began deploying to "Yugoslavia" on 8 March 1992, however, one condition had significantly changed: the peace. The cease-fire in Croatia was being challenged:

On 24 March, Lt.-Gen. Nambiar [the UNPROFOR Commander] issued an urgent appeal to authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb to end the cease-fire violations which had intensified in frequency and seriousness in some areas. Those violations "needlessly prolonged" the suffering of the civilian population and could delay UNPROFOR's full deployment, he said.

Even worse, there was no longer peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the UNPROFOR headquarters was being established. Here Serbian irregulars had initiated hostilities on 3 March 1992 in protest of the (29 February and 1 March) referendum results in which Muslims and Croats voted for independence from a "Yugoslavia" dominated by Serbia. The fighting gathered momentum in early April 1992. "The weekend of 4 to 5 April was the most violent in the republic since World War II, leading many Bosnians to fear that a full-fledged civil war was unavoidable."¹²

Thus, instead of the peaceful conditions that the cease-fire had seemingly guaranteed, UNPROFOR faced hostile conditions as soon as it hit the ground. Strangely, in spite of the violent conditions and the inability of the Bosnian government to enforce law and order, the EC formally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state on 6 April 1992, and the United States did likewise on 7 April. This is explained perhaps by the hope that early recognition would prevent further conflict.

UNPROFOR had numerous objectives. Its main aim, though, was to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis--but this had been defined as the dispute over areas of Croatia. While UNPROFOR was to create the conditions of peace and security on the ground, the Conference on Yugoslavia, sponsored by the EC, would

handle the negotiation of a political settlement. In keeping with its main aim, UNPROFOR took on the following tasks: (1) ensure that the UNPAs in Croatia are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them; (2) ensure that all persons residing in the UNPAs are protected from fear of armed attack; (3) monitor the functioning of the local police in the UNPAs to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights; and, (4) facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.¹³

To accomplish its overall aim and its many tasks, UNPROFOR was well-resourced. Behind the U.N. Operation in the Congo (UNOC) and the recently established U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UNPROFOR would have the third largest peacekeeping force in U.N. history.

UNPROFOR was to be composed of 13,340 military, 530 police, and 519 civilian personnel. Lieutenant-General Satish-Nambiar of India was named as the UNPROFOR Commander. The following countries provided military contingents: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. The military component

would consist of a headquarters, 12 enlarged infantry battalions (10,400 soldiers), logistics and other support elements (2,840 personnel), and 100 military observers. Additionally, there would be an air unit made up of four fixed-wing aircraft and 26 helicopters.¹⁴

A Police Commissioner, appointed by the Secretary-General, would command the police component, and personnel would be provided by Governments. The civilian component, largely UN staff members, would perform a range of political, legal, information and administrative functions. The Director of Civil Affairs would establish in each sector a civil affairs office that would coordinate with the corresponding military commander. Local administration and the maintenance of public order would be among the responsibilities of the civil affairs officers.¹⁵

Two other resources of importance were time and money. Regarding time, UNPROFOR was given an initial period of 12 months--until 21 February 1993--to conduct operations. On the matter of financing, the Secretary-General recommended that a \$634 million budget be borne by the member states of the U.N.¹⁶

By 24 April 1992, 8,332 UNPROFOR personnel had arrived in Yugoslavia. Conditions were not as expected. They had deployed into a civil war. Would the planned 14,000 personnel be enough to accomplish UNPROFOR's main aim and assigned tasks? Would events go as planned?

As is widely known, events did not go as planned for UNPROFOR. How, then, did the conditions, objectives, and resources change over time? Basically, conditions

stabilized to an extent in the UNPAs, but conditions deteriorated continuously in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The first wave of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in early March, as stated, and centered around Sarajevo. Again, this is where the UNPROFOR established its headquarters.

UN personnel were caught in a crossfire between two fighting groups. UN property, including vehicles, had sustained considerable damage. However, only two light casualties had been reported among the UN personnel.

Because of the violence, the Security Council directed that two-thirds of the headquarters be moved to Belgrade. The approximately 100 remaining personnel continued efforts toward improving conditions in Sarajevo: arranging meetings between the conflict parties, assisting in the exchange of prisoners, and conducting various humanitarian tasks. There was, as yet, no U.N. mandate to intervene in Sarajevo.

One must question the retention of part of the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo and the U.N. operations there. After all, UNPROFOR's peacekeeping operations were planned to take place in the three UNPAs, not in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With battles raging in Sarajevo, the U.N. should have moved the entire UNPROFOR headquarters out of Bosnia-Herzegovina because peacekeepers do not belong in an area lacking a cease-fire agreement. The Security Council should have conducted a new study on

what to do about Bosnia-Herzegovina: peacemaking, use of force, sanctions, or otherwise. It must be emphasized that three entirely new groups were involved in this phase and had not been party to the fifteenth cease-fire agreement: the Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. As well, the YPA and Croatian Army elements were again engaged in the conflict.

The Security Council, while erring in keeping part of the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, continued efforts to negotiate a new cease-fire. On 15 May 1992, a cease-fire agreement was reportedly reached in Sarajevo. Also on 15 May, the Security Council adopted resolution 752 (1992), demanding an end to the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the cessation of all outside interference (including that of the YPA and the Croatian Army), the withdrawal of these military elements, the disarming of irregulars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and complete freedom of movement for UNPROFOR.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the bombardment of Sarajevo continued, and the conflict expanded into other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. Already by 10 May 1992, the death toll stood at 1,320, and nearly 700,000 had left their homes.¹⁹ Others were trapped in cities and besieged by irregular forces or by the YPA.

Meanwhile, the work of UNPROFOR in the UNPAs was progressing fairly well. By 15 May 1992, as part of a phased implementation of the peace plan, UNPROFOR had

assumed responsibility for one of the three UNPAs--
Eastern Slavonia. Another mark of progress was withdrawal
of some YPA elements:

On 28 May, Lieutenant-General Satish Nambiar of India, the UNPROFOR Commander, met in Croatia with leaders of the JNA [YPA] and the Croatian Army Command, after which the two sides confirmed the withdrawal of all heavy artillery beyond the lines of confrontation.²⁰

Rather than concentrate on efforts in these UNPAs, however, the Security Council began to expand the role of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina on an ad hoc basis.

On 8 June 1992, the Security Council increased UNPROFOR's objectives and resources in Sarajevo through resolution 758 (1992). This motion was the first enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate, and it contained UNPROFOR's fifth mission: to assume full responsibility for the functioning and security of Sarajevo airport. Concerning resources, it authorized the deployment of 60 military observers and related equipment to Sarajevo.²¹ These personnel were to supervise the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons from Sarajevo, the displacement of certain heavy weapons to designated locations in the city, and the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo. The Security Council also demanded that all conflict parties cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and participate in the establishment of a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its airport.²² Cooperation

would not be forthcoming. Sarajevo was geographically and strategically important to all sides. This capital was the site of the Muslim-led Bosnian government, yet it was surrounded by Serbian positions. Serbian forces controlled the airport to the southwest as well. Also, Sarajevo lay at the key crossroads between eastern Bosnia, controlled by Serbs except for a few Muslim enclaves, and central Bosnia, controlled by Croats and Muslims.

The second wave of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina began in late June 1992 and was precipitated by a new Serbian military offensive. This second wave brought further dangerous conditions to UNPROFOR. These conditions were to make it extremely difficult for UNPROFOR to ensure the functioning and security of the Sarajevo airport:

The Secretary-General reported on 26 June that Bosnian Serb forces had increased their bombardment of Dobrinja, a suburb of Sarajevo close to the airport. Tank and infantry attacks had been carried out and heavy artillery had been used against the civilian population. The Secretary-General condemned the continued attacks and called upon the Serb side to cease those attacks immediately.²³

The death toll in Bosnia-Herzegovina rose rapidly. This latest Serbian military offensive should have convinced the Security Council that the Belgrade leadership (Milosevic and other Serbian nationalists) was orchestrating a Serbian takeover of as much Bosnian territory as possible--to ensure that Serbian-populated areas would remain within the sphere of the Serbian-

Montenegrin state, or perhaps to establish small Serbian states allied to the greater Serbian-Montenegrin state.

However, the Security Council entered a Vietnam-like or Afghanistan-like escalation mentality and proceeded to increase the objectives and resources of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This criticism is not at all directed against the Security Council's intentions. However, peacekeeping efforts should occur after a cease-fire is established; they should not be increased while attempting to negotiate one. Nonetheless, here are U.N. actions taken right after the second wave of violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina:

29 June. The UNSC [Security Council] adopts resolution 761 [1992] authorizing deployment of additional forces to ensure functioning of the Sarajevo airport and delivery of humanitarian aid. Thirty-four UN peacekeepers officially assume control of the airport from Serbian forces.

3 July. The UN begins coordinating an airlift of relief supplies to Sarajevo.

13 July. The UNSC authorizes an increase in UN personnel in Sarajevo from 1,100 to 1,600.

25 August. The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution calling on the Security Council to take "further appropriate measures" to end the war in Bosnia, including direct military action if necessary.²⁴

Direct military action, however, would mean a shift from peacekeeping operations and the adjunct humanitarian relief efforts to peace enforcement operations. There was no consensus on "further appropriate measures."

Meanwhile, peacekeeping operations in the UNPAs continued to make headway. On 20 June 1992, UNPROFOR took control over the second of the three UNPAs. This second UNPA was that of Western Slavonia. In late June, UNPROFOR gained control of the remaining UNPA (composed of sectors N and S)--the Krajina.²⁵ UNPROFOR was able to gain early success here in Croatia, but none in Bosnia-Herzegovina, through the cooperation of the two sides that had agreed to the Geneva Agreement and Mr. Vance's plan. UNPROFOR's next step would be to demilitarize the UNPAs and ensure that the local police carry out their functions impartially.

On 30 June, the Security Council, through resolution 762 (1992), gave UNPROFOR the mission--the sixth one overall--of overseeing the process of restoring order in the "pink zones": areas of Croatia controlled by the YPA and now populated largely by Serbs but located outside the UNPA boundaries. It authorized an additional 60 military observers and 120 civilian police to carry out this mission.²⁶

A few weeks later, on 7 August, the Security Council approved the second enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate by passing resolution 769 (1992). UNPROFOR was assigned the mission--the seventh overall--to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform

immigration and customs functions at international frontiers and UNPA borders.²⁷

The third wave of violence arose in early September 1992 and consisted of "ethnic cleansing" and various military engagements. This third wave was less intense in comparison to either the March-May fighting over Sarajevo or the June Serbian offensive. By this point, the Serbs were in control of approximately 60% of the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats some 25%, and the Muslims about 15%, including several isolated pockets.

As stated, this third wave of violence has been characterized as "ethnic cleansing." In essence, this meant that Serbs and Croats were pushing others out of areas that they were generally in control of, mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina but also in the UNPAs of Croatia, which hindered UNPROFOR's efforts there. In pushing others out, there was a great deal of violence directed against civilians and their property. The Serbian side was particularly brutal in its "ethnic cleansing" of Muslims. Additionally, there were firefights, artillery actions, ambushes, and sniper activities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbian paramilitary groups, such as the Tigers and the Chetniks, as well as Croatian paramilitary forces, were responsible for much of the killing.²⁸

UNPROFOR was not spared from the violence. On 8 September 1992, two French members were killed and five

were wounded near Sarajevo.²⁹ Sometimes relief convoys were even blocked by crowds of Serb civilians, demanding aid for themselves and discouraging the delivery of food to the Muslims. This behavior is explained by the following passage:

Serb forces, which have been singled out by the United Nations as the aggressor in the seven-month Bosnian war, have used a novel method to block U.N. convoys from the besieged town of Srebrenica. Twice in the past three months [September - November 1992], Serb forces have organized Serb women and children to block the highway leading to the Muslim town. The women and children have chanted that they are hungry and that food should not be allowed to reach their enemy.³⁰

This third wave of violence has persisted from early September to the present.

Once again, the United Nations continued to raise the tasks and resources of the UNPROFOR ad hoc. On 14 September, the Security Council adopted resolution 776 (1992)--the humanitarian convoy protection mission, and UNPROFOR's eighth mission to date. The resolution authorized the use of armed escorts as necessary to enable the delivery of relief supplies throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, allowed UNPROFOR to protect personnel released from detention camps, and provided for additional UNPROFOR resources to enable it to carry out its enhanced role.³¹

On 22 September 1992, the General Assembly took an action that was long overdue. On that date, through resolution 47/1, it denied the claim of Serbia-Montenegro

the U.N. seat held by the former Yugoslavia. The vote was 127 to 6 (Kenya, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe), with 26 abstentions.³²

In debate, a number of speakers questioned the resolution's legal basis, stating that it bypassed the Charter, set a dangerous precedent which could be used against other Member States in the future,³³ and posed a threat to ongoing peace negotiations.

In October, UNPROFOR's mandate continued to grow. On 6 October 1992, the Security Council authorized the third enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate through resolution 779 (1992). UNPROFOR--now with a ninth mission--would be responsible for monitoring the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik (Croatia) and for ensuring the demilitarization of this area.³⁴ Then, on 9 October 1992, the Security Council authorized the fourth enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate with resolution 781 (1992). In this motion, the Security Council decided to establish a ban on military flights in Bosnian airspace. It assigned yet another mission to UNPROFOR, the tenth overall: to monitor compliance with the ban, including the placement of military observers at airfields in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.³⁵

Further steps into the quagmire came in November and December 1992. On 16 November, the Security Council approved a sea blockade against Serbia-Montenegro. On 11 December, the Security Council approved the fifth

enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate through resolution 795 (1992). Under this resolution, UNPROFOR would deploy an infantry battalion, 35 military observers, and over 80 additional personnel (police, civil affairs, and administrative) to Macedonia, a former republic of Yugoslavia not yet recognized as a state. UNPROFOR's mission--its eleventh overall--was to monitor and report any developments in the border areas of Macedonia that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory.³⁶

Besides this new operation in Macedonia, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and General Nambiar requested, in late December 1992, yet an additional mission and associated resources. This mission would include:

. . . the right not only to search but also to turn back or confiscate military personnel, weapons or sanctioned goods whose passage into or out of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be contrary to [previous] decisions of the Council.³⁷

The resources would be enormous: ". . . a force of approximately 10,000 troops, including the necessary logistic, medical and engineering support."³⁸ Not counting this latest recommendation, UNPROFOR consisted of 23,000 members at the end of 1992--8,500 above the original mandate.

Again, it cannot be overemphasized that the Security Council mistakenly took one step after another

to expand the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though a credible cease-fire was never established for this phase of the Yugoslav Conflict. Meanwhile, the EC tried in vain to reach a political settlement through negotiations. What, then, was the United States doing throughout this crisis?

What roles did the United States--the lone remaining superpower--play in both the unfolding of the conflict and in the decision-making at the U.N.? On the eve of the Slovenian Phase of the Yugoslav Conflict, Secretary of State James Baker went to Belgrade:

But Baker missed current events: he warned Slovenia and Croatia not to secede or expect U.S. recognition at a time when the republ³⁹igs were yearning to be free of Belgrade . . .

The United States simply wanted stability in Yugoslavia.

Two months into the Croatian Phase of the Yugoslav Conflict, Secretary Baker, in his statement at the 25 September 1991 U.N. Security Council meeting, reproached Serbia and the YPA for their activities in Croatia:

James A. Baker III, Secretary of State of the United States, said the Government of Serbia and the Yugoslav federal military bore a special and growing responsibility for the grim future which awaited the peoples of Yugoslavia if they did not stop the bloodshed and reverse the violent course being pursued. The federal military was not serving as an impartial guarantor of a cease-fire in Croatia. It had actively supported local Serbian forces in violating the cease-fire, causing death to the citizens it⁴⁰ was constitutionally supposed to be protecting.

The United States was still looking to a single "Yugoslavia."

Until the end of the Croatian Phase, the U.S. maintained a hands-off approach. Basically, the U.S. let the Europeans, whose security mechanisms were in transition, take the lead in dealing with this conflict. Then, on 6 December 1991, the U.S. Department of State imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, which included the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

During the Bosnian Phase, the United States changed its position on a single "Yugoslavia" and became more active in addressing the conflict. The following are a few of the significant actions taken by the U.S.:

7 April 1992. The United States recognizes the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia.

20 May 1992. The United States suspends landing rights for Yugoslav National Airlines.

22 May 1992. Secretary Baker, in London, announces diplomatic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro because of the "humanitarian nightmare." With U.S. support, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia become members of the United Nations.

30 May 1992. The United Nations adopts Resolution 757 [1992], co-sponsored by the United States, imposing immediate sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro, including a trade embargo, the freezing of assets abroad, the prohibition of air traffic, the reduction of diplomatic staff, a ban on participation in official cultural and sporting events, and suspension of scientific and technical cooperation.

President Bush freezes Yugoslav assets in the U.S.

5 June 1992. President Bush issues an executive order imposing a trade embargo on Serbia-Montenegro.

13 August 1992. Based on U.S. initiative, UNSC Resolution 770 [1992] authorizes "all measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S.-sponsored UNSC Resolution 771 [1992] demands immediate access to detention centers by the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] and asks countries to provide information⁴¹ on possible violations of humanitarian law.

Beginning in October 1992, the United States took two new steps with its military, beyond the many flights of humanitarian relief supplies into airports of the former Yugoslavia. In October, the U.S. deployed a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) to Zagreb (Croatia). Then, in November, the U.S.S. Halyburton (an American frigate), along with other NATO warships, began enforcing a naval blockade against Serbia-Montenegro, in support of the U.N.'s decision to tighten economic sanctions.⁴² Besides these two steps, President Bush apparently warned Serbian authorities not to take military action in Kosovo:

Diplomats in Geneva said Sunday [27 December 1992] that President Bush has warned Serbian leaders that the U.S. is ready to use military force if they widen the Balkan war to Kosovo, a Serbian province inhabited mainly by ethnic Albanians.⁴³

Through this warning, President Bush sought to prevent hostilities in Kosovo--hostilities which could have pulled a number of countries into the fray.

The timing and logic of certain U.S. actions, namely those of 7 April 1992 and 22 May 1992, must be

seriously challenged. Why did the United States wait until 7 April 1992 to recognize Croatia and Slovenia? After all, these two breakaway republics had declared their independence on 25 June 1991. They had exhausted efforts to resolve the political crisis with the Serbian leaders, who had rejected the proposal for a confederation and who had paralyzed the federal system. Croatia and Slovenia certainly possessed the necessary characteristics to be recognized as states: a geographically bounded entity, a central authority with the ability to make laws, and a law enforcement capability.

Arguably, recognition of these republics as states in June 1991 might have brought accusations of meddling in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. It might have also strengthened the position of conservatives in the Soviet Union at the expense of President Gorbachev. On the other hand, recognition might have caused Serbian President Milosevic and his colleagues not to make that heinous decision of using the YPA to secure control over certain areas in Croatia on 2 August 1991. They surely would have had to add a new consideration to their decision-making process.

In the same vein, how could the United States have recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state on 7 April 1992? This date was one month after the outbreak of hostilities there, and only two days after a weekend of

tremendous fighting: "The weekend of 4 to 5 April was the most violent in the republic since World War II, leading many Bosnians to fear that a full-fledged civil war was unavoidable."⁴⁴ In the midst of this violence and disorder, Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly did not meet one of the basic characteristics of a state: a law enforcement capability. Besides, although this republic had held a referendum on independence, it had not formally declared independence.

Regarding the 22 May 1992 action, why did the United States wait so long to impose diplomatic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro? Shortly after the 1 August 1991 YPA initiation of hostilities in Croatia would have been the most appropriate time. Even March or April 1992, as the YPA was providing support to the Serbian irregulars in their battles for Sarajevo, would have been better than May. The decision to impose diplomatic sanctions admittedly required much time and debate.

Concerning the effectiveness of the various actions taken by the United States, none of them resulted in the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and none of them stopped the Serbs from continuing their land-grab or their "ethnic cleansing." Perhaps the most that can be said is that the United States: (1) helped relieve some of the suffering of the victims through aid shipments and the MASH, and (2) created economic difficulties for

Serbia-Montenegro:

As a result of the sanctions the official price of gasoline was doubled in early June [1992] in both Serbia and Montenegro, and the Belgrade government announced it would introduce gasoline rationing.

. . . Moreover, industrial production in Serbia has declined 18 percent since 1991, and unemployment in Serbia stood at 20 percent in June. As a result of Serbian fiscal policies, prices in May 1992 were 1,915.7 percent higher than in May 1991, and the inflation rate last May alone stood at 80.5 percent (80.9 percent in Montenegro), or an annual 120,000 percent.⁴⁵

In his article, "How the West Lost Bosnia: Four Missed Opportunities on the Road to Chaos," journalist Tom Post suggests that the West could have taken better action on four earlier occasions. In June 1991, at the time of James Baker's trip to Belgrade, Post argues that early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, tied to guaranteed minority rights, might have forestalled the entire conflict. In January 1992, when the U.N. was deliberating over Mr. Vance's peace plan, Post argues that the West could have warned Serbia not to interfere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or risk diplomatic and economic isolation. In March 1992, when the Muslims pleaded for U.N. peacekeepers, Post claims that the West might have placed a small force in Sarajevo, in order to deter the siege of the capital. Finally, in June 1992, at the time of Francois Mitterand's visit to Sarajevo, Post states that the West should have threatened Serbia with a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁶ According to Post:

"Now, as winter closes in, few options besides military remain."⁴⁷ Perhaps Post is right, but who would want to put combat troops into such a diffuse situation? Clearly, the West does not want to, yet the South (Muslim states) was pushing the U.N. for direct military action in late 1992. Islamic fundamentalists were even calling for individual volunteers to fight a holy war on behalf of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, in the midst of combat conditions, UNPROFOR persevered in its humanitarian relief efforts.

CHAPTER 4

ASSESSMENT AND LESSONS LEARNED

This chapter addresses the following three questions: (1) In what ways was UNPROFOR successful and unsuccessful in 1992?; (2) What lessons can be drawn from the Yugoslav case for future peacekeeping operations in regional/ethnic conflict environments?; and, (3) What lessons can be drawn for the United States?

Before addressing the question concerning UNPROFOR's successes and failures, a review of UNPROFOR's missions is in order. As was previously explained, the main aim of UNPROFOR was to create the conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. The following is a recapitulation of the significant missions assigned to UNPROFOR in 1992:

Original Mandate (approved on 21 February 1992)

(1) to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them.

(2) to ensure that all persons residing in the UNPAs are protected from fear of armed attack.

(3) to monitor the functioning of the local police in the UNPAs to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights.

(4) to facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.

1st Enlargement of the Mandate
(approved on 8 June 1992)

(5) to ensure the security of Sarajevo airport and supervise the operation of the airport; to ensure the safe movement of humanitarian aid and related personnel at Sarajevo; to verify the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapon systems from within range of the airport; and, to monitor the concentration of artillery, mortar, and ground-to-ground missile systems in specified areas vicinity Sarajevo.

Mission on "Pink Zones"
(authorized on 30 June 1992)

(6) to monitor the process of restoring authority in the "pink zones" by the Croatian Government.

2nd Enlargement of the Mandate
(approved on 7 August 1992)

(7) to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers.

Humanitarian Convoy Protection Mission
(approved on 14 September 1992)

(8) to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary; likewise, to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was practicable.

3rd Enlargement of the Mandate
(authorized on 6 October 1992)

(9) to monitor the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the Prevlaka Peninsula and ensure the peninsula's demilitarization.

4th Enlargement of the Mandate
(authorized on 9 October 1992)

(10) to monitor compliance with the ban of all military flights in the air space of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to report immediately any evidence of violations.¹

5th Enlargement of the Mandate
(approved on 11 December 1992)

(11) to monitor and report any developments in the border areas of Macedonia which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia or threaten its territory.²

In its execution of these eleven missions, UNPROFOR made little headway. UNPROFOR's efforts yielded success on only one mission (number 9), failure on three missions (numbers 2, 4, and 7), and mixed results on six missions (numbers 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 10). Insufficient time has elapsed to allow for judgment on the final mission (number 11). Each of these missions will now be examined in depth.

Regarding the first mission--demilitarization of the UNPAs--UNPROFOR achieved some degree of success, yet it still has significant obstacles to overcome. On 28 September 1992, five months after the bulk of UNPROFOR had arrived, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that the YPA had withdrawn from the UNPAs and that the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) were largely demobilized.³

However, these two steps did not mean complete demilitarization of the UNPAs. In fact, of the four sectors, only one--Sector W--was fully demilitarized.⁴ Counterproductive to UNPROFOR's efforts, the self-proclaimed "Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina" was creating new armed groups:

But complete demilitarization of the UNPAs in accordance with the plan has been obstructed by the so-called "Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina" (hereinafter referred to as the "Knin authorities"). These authorities have replaced the JNA [YPA] and the TDF with Serb militia forces under various guises, comprising former JNA and TDF soldiers as well as irregular elements. They may total 16,000 personnel or more and are equipped with armoured personnel carriers, mortars, machine guns and other arms prohibited under the peace-keeping plan. They are sometimes claimed by the Knin authorities to be police, but UNPROFOR does not accept this; they are not trained or equipped⁵ as police, nor do they perform police functions.

On two occasions in late July 1992, UNPROFOR battalions confronted elements of these troublesome Serbian militia forces and attempted a somewhat forceful approach. In the first instance, a Belgian battalion blocked in a brigade of Serbian "special police" in the northwestern corner of Baranja (in Sector E). In the second case, a Russian battalion blockaded a large group of Serbian "border police" in the area between Lipovac and Marinci (also in Sector E). In both cases, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, and UNPROFOR forces withdrew in order to avoid fighting. Since that time, these Serbian

militias continued to block demilitarization efforts and became increasingly hostile toward UNPROFOR personnel.⁶

Actions by the Croatian side also were detrimental to UNPROFOR's demilitarization efforts. Although Croatian authorities did not directly violate the demilitarization operation in 1992, they were guilty of indirectly impairing this operation. Just outside the UNPA borders, the Croatian Army maintained, and even re-established, some of its forces. "Members of the Croatian Government have also, from time to time, publicly asserted that they will re-establish Croatian control over the areas by unilateral means."⁷

The overriding reason, though, that complete demilitarization was not achieved was the perverse behavior of the Knin authorities. Their establishment of Serbian militia forces totally frustrated UNPROFOR's efforts. However, the Belgrade authorities were also much to blame, as reported by the Secretary-General on 24 November 1992:

For their part, my representatives have insisted that the Security Council continue to hold the Belgrade authorities responsible for the implementation of the peace-keeping plan, to which they had earlier agreed. It seems evident that the Belgrade authorities could, if they so chose, take measures which would have a strongly persuasive effect upon the local Serb authorities, especially in view of the considerable economic dependence of much of the UNPAs upon the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].⁸

Turning to UNPROFOR's second mission--the protection of persons in the UNPAs--UNPROFOR was not

successful at all. One sector--Sector W (the only sector demilitarized)--became "relatively" safe.

In the other three sectors, however, daily police reports describe murders, the burning and demolition of houses, the destruction of churches, the killing of cattle and other domestic animals, armed robberies and assaults, all of which crimes are usually aimed at members of national minorities. Because, in some areas, few minority members other than the very old have remained, an especially distressing feature is the number of armed attacks on the homes and properties of very old women. They are often committed by groups of uniformed men, sometimes masked, carrying automatic weapons. In some parts of Sector South, United Nations civilian police (UNCIVPOL) reports that terror has become so prevalent that inhabitants are sleeping in woods or under trees, away from their homes.

In these three sectors (North, South, and East), Serbs committed the vast majority of the crimes, against Croats. However, in Sector West, which saw less violence, Croats often conducted acts of intimidation against Serbs.

Several reasons can be given for UNPROFOR's inability to protect persons in the UNPAs. Among them are the following: ethnic/nationalistic sentiment which had spiraled out of control, the nature of the crimes committed (acts of terrorism), noncooperation on the part of local Serbian authorities, the unwillingness of Belgrade authorities to persuade local Serbian authorities to cooperate with UNPROFOR, and harmful statements and actions by Croatian Government members.¹⁰ However, the main obstacle to UNPROFOR on the mission of affording protection

to persons in the UNPAs was the terroristic actions of the Serbian militia forces.

The third UNPROFOR mission--monitoring the functioning of local police--saw a rather peculiar combination of failure and success. It must be pointed out that according to the peacekeeping plan, UNPROFOR civilian police forces had no direct responsibility for the maintenance of public order. The preservation of public order in the UNPAs was solely the responsibility of local police forces, who were supposed to carry only side-arms. Basically, UNPROFOR conducted this monitoring mission through the collocation of UNCIVPOL personnel with local police headquarters. These personnel accompanied local police on patrols and other duties.¹¹

On the one hand, the U.N. Secretary-General reported a breakdown in local law enforcement: "The local civil police in Serb-controlled areas of the UNPAs seem virtually powerless, and the system of law enforcement has substantially disintegrated."¹² Again, the reason for failure was the disruptive activities of the Serbian militia forces. On the other hand, the U.N. Secretary-General reported an unexpected, positive trend:

. . . the trend amongst the local population has increasingly been to treat UNCIVPOL as the legitimate source of authority, and confidence in them has continued to grow in all sections of the community,¹³ despite their lack of executive authority.

The fourth UNPROFOR mission--return of civilian displaced persons--was an absolute failure. In three of the four sectors (North, South, and East), there was no discernible return. In Sector West, minor activity occurred, but it does not merit success of any sort:

To date, nearly 2,000 people have been able to travel, under UNPROFOR protection, to their former homes in more than 50 villages, and a step-by-step rebuilding of confidence amongst present and former inhabitants is under way. . . . It should be added, however, that few people have yet effected a permanent return, even under these relatively benign conditions, and it is still too early to say authoritatively how successful the Sector West return program will be.

The two overriding reasons why there was no return of displaced persons in Sectors North, South, and East were: (1) the presence of the Serbian militias, and (2) the lack of a political settlement. In Sector West, both Croatian extremist elements and Croatian police also played an intimidating role, which deterred displaced Serbs from returning to areas there. Besides the threats that militias and extremists posed, there was also a damaged infrastructure to contend with. Basic services within the UNPAs, such as water and electricity, still cannot accommodate the return of displaced persons until major repairs are made.

The fifth UNPROFOR mission (and the first enlargement of its mandate)--the security and relief operation at Sarajevo airport--can be criticized for

repeated failure, yet must also be credited with noteworthy success. One can cite failure in UNPROFOR's inability to guarantee safe conditions for either the flights to Sarajevo airport or the humanitarian deliveries from the airport to the city. Sarajevo airport had to be closed to air traffic several times, most notably from 1 to 18 December 1992 after a U.S. aid plane had been hit by small arms fire. However, UNPROFOR achieved considerable success as well:

Throughout the reporting period, Sector Sarajevo has continued to carry out its mandate of keeping open, and operating, Sarajevo airport and escorting convoys of relief supplies from the airport to the city. A total of 1,619 humanitarian flights, carrying 19,669 metric tons of aid, have been flown into the airport.

This humanitarian relief was certainly a tremendous feat, considering the continual bombardment by Serbian artillery against the non-Serb areas of Sarajevo, as well as the many incidents of sniper activity. Blame for disruptions of security and relief operations in and around Sarajevo rests primarily with the Bosnian Serb forces (regular and irregular), their Yugoslav Army counterparts, and the Belgrade authorities who provided direction and support to Serbian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To substantiate the reasons for UNPROFOR's failure in Sarajevo (as well as in the mission to protect humanitarian convoys in Bosnia-Herzegovina), one can look to four telling statements. The first passage, by Dr.

Milan Vego, an instructor at the U.S. Naval War College, discusses the involvement of the YPA in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as who was providing command and control:

The reorganization of the YPA carried out in December 1991 led to the establishment of a new military district with its headquarters in Sarajevo. Additional federal troops were moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina from Serbia in the first few months of 1992. By then, the process of 'Serbianization' of the former federal army, which started in the aftermath of war in Slovenia, was almost complete. The main aim of the redeployments and reorganization of the federal troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to ensure military control of that republic. The former federal army was apparently determined not to be forced to leave yet another republic of the former Yugoslavia. The army, while professing to act to prevent inter-ethnic clashes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was covertly providing large quantities of arms to the local Serbian para-military forces. . . . The operational chain of command in the federal army runs from the Supreme Defence Council (composed of the president of the FRY and the presidents of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro) through the General Staff in Belgrade to the commanders of: 1st MD [Military District] (Belgrade), 4th MD (Podgorica), the 'Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,' Naval District (Kumbor, Bay of Cattaro), Air Force and Air Defence units.

The counter-argument, as stated earlier, is that the YPA was responsible for protecting the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social order of Yugoslavia.

George Kenney, deputy chief and later acting chief of Yugoslav affairs in the U.S. State Department from February 1992 until his resignation on 25 August 1992 provides the second definitive statement:

What happened in Bosnia is that a radical group of Serbian ethnic nationalists and militants did not want to go along with the idea that Bosnia would be an independent state. They called for help to Belgrade, and Belgrade . . . as part of its larger drive for a greater, ethnically pure Serbia was willing to help and had the Yugoslav army in there fighting with the militants. What really happened is a war from the outside.

In his words, Mr. Kenney resigned (on 25 August 1992)

"because I thought that if I criticized the administration from the outside, there's a possibility that the administration will rethink what it's doing in Yugoslavia."¹⁸

The third revealing passage comes from Lord Owen, Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, taken from his speech on 16 December 1992:

The overriding challenge is, however, to roll back the Bosnian Serbs, and here General Mladic [Commander of the Army of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina"] is becoming evermore important. He is a determined officer. While he probably listens to President Cosic [President of Yugoslavia, and Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army] and General Panic [Chief of the Yugoslav Army], he is not controlled by them. He answers to [Serbian] President Milosevic.

It is Belgrade, above all, that control[s] the main pressure points on the Bosnian Serbs. Mr. Karadzic ["President" of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina"] ultimately answers to Belgrade, and in effect the Bosnian Serb military effort and economy, apart from food is critically dependent on decisions taken in Belgrade. We are right therefore in believing that Belgrade has--if it cares to exercise it--the capacity to deliver a settlement.¹⁹

The fourth telling passage concerns the naming of alleged war criminals by U.S. Secretary of State Eagleburger on 16 December 1992:

"There is another category of fact which is beyond dispute," he said, "namely the fact of political and command responsibility for the crimes against humanity which I have described. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the president of the self-declared Serbian Bosnian republic, and Gen. Ratko Mladic, commander of Bosnian Serb military forces, must eventually explain whether and how they sought to insure, as they must under international law, that their forces complied with international law."

He said that the United States had concluded that Serbian authorities had flouted previous international agreements. That, he said, had not only produced "an intolerable and deteriorating situation inside the former Yugoslavia, it is also beginning to threaten the framework of stability in the new Europe."²⁰

Although the Serbian forces and leadership are to blame for UNPROFOR's difficulty in Sarajevo, the Security Council should never have allowed UNPROFOR elements to remain in a conflict environment (which had no cease-fire agreement). Greater resources for UNPROFOR could not overcome problems posed by these unsuitable conditions.

The sixth UNPROFOR mission--restoration of authority in the pink zones--had mixed results, resembling those of UNPROFOR's first mission (demilitarization of the UNPAs). The following statement summarizes the predicament here:

Meanwhile, UNPROFOR's presence in the "pink zones" has helped to stabilize the situation there to some degree, although on the one side acts of terrorism continue, and, on the other, cease-fire violations and provocations are frequent.²¹

Once again, the greatest hindrance to UNPROFOR's efforts was the behavior of the Serbian Knin authorities. The Secretary-General emphatically placed blame on the Knin authorities in his 24 November 1992 report:

It is they who have refused to withdraw their forces from the "pink zones" and have blocked full implementation of resolution 762 (1992) by pursuing the aim of consolidating the status quo in those areas rather than facilitating the orderly restoration of Croatian authority there.²²

Besides the Knin authorities, various local authorities within the pink zones were also counterproductive. Rather than help establish peaceful conditions, they made conditions worse for ethnic minorities, as the following passage indicates:

A particularly disagreeable feature of the situation in the "pink zones" is the readiness of both sides, but especially the Serb side, to cut power and water supplies as a means of putting pressure on opponents.²³

The seventh UNPROFOR mission (and the second enlargement of its mandate)--controlling the UNPA borders--proved to be impossible. Yet again, the reason for failure rests with the Knin authorities:

. . . the implementation of the recommended approach has not so far proved possible since the Knin authorities have themselves placed controls and checkpoints at all major crossing points, including international crossings. It would be impossible for UNPROFOR to conduct such functions in a satisfactory and visibly independent manner if its positions²⁴ were co-located with those of the Knin authorities.

On 2 November 1992, the "President" of the so-called "Serb Republic of Krajina" agreed to move 95% of his checkpoints.

However, on 4 November 1992, the Knin authorities reversed their position, stating that they would withdraw none of their checkpoints. They cited the rights emanating from their claimed sovereignty.²⁵

Turning now to the eighth UNPROFOR mission--the protection of humanitarian convoys--a moderate degree of success was achieved. In November 1992, the UNHCR was delivering about 900 tons of food and other relief aid each day to over one million recipients across Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁶ In order to carry out this mission (approved on 14 September 1992), UNPROFOR established four zones and assigned one infantry battalion group to each. However, by 24 November 1992, only two battalion groups (Spain and the United Kingdom) were able to execute convoy protection in most parts of their assigned zones.²⁷

As indicated in the discussion on Sarajevo relief efforts, the main hindrances to UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina were the activities of Serbian forces. The inability of UNPROFOR to escort relief convoys to the Muslim-held towns of Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa were striking examples of Serbian interference:

Serb officers blocked a food convoy to Srebrenica on Thursday [26 November 1992], but a United Nations spokesman said the relief trucks would reach the embattled city today. Another U.N. relief convoy completed its delivery to the government-held town of Gorazde 30 miles southeast of Sarajevo, and was reported on its way back. It was delayed Wednesday when an armored ambulance hit a mine. Nobody was hurt. The convoy to Gorazde was only the third

since it was besieged in the spring. Srebrenica has had no relief at all during the war; Serbs prevented all previous attempts to deliver food.²⁸

Serb gunmen and mines have prevented U.N. convoys from crossing the snowy roads to Zepa, where some people are living in caves. The town's regional population²⁹ of 8,000 has been swollen by 20,000 refugees.

Besides the threat posed by Serbian forces, humanitarian convoys to Muslim areas were also blocked by Serbian civilians on occasion. Such actions did not prevent, just delayed, the advance of the convoys.

Still another obstacle to UNPROFOR's execution of convoy protection was the lack of cooperation from certain local authorities:

So far, however, advance elements of the Canadian battalion, which has arrived in Daruvar in Sector West, have not been able to carry out any reconnaissance in the Banja Luka area, as the Bosnian Serb authorities there have denied access to them.³⁰

Likewise, the French battalion group, responsible for the Velika Kladusa-Bihac area in northwestern Bosnia, was not able to gain permission from the local Serbian authorities to deploy into this area. Because of Serbian interference with U.N. convoy operations, the U.N. resorted to the following measure on 23 November 1992:

The United Nations has suspended aid deliveries to 100,000 people in Serb-held parts of Bosnia to press Serb forces into allowing food convoys to reach the two Muslim towns [Gorazde and Srebrenica] that are believed to be in desperate need. The cut-off of food deliveries to predominantly Serb areas of eastern Bosnia marks the first time that the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the

major aid agency in the Bosnian war³¹ has used such hardball tactics with Serb forces.

The ninth UNPROFOR mission (and the third enlargement of its mandate)--demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula--saw the greatest results. The Dubrovnik area was noted for some of the heaviest fighting of the Croatian Phase of the Yugoslav Conflict (the phase from 2 August 1991 to 3 January 1992). By 21 October 1992 the Yugoslav Army had completed its withdrawal from the peninsula, monitored by UNPROFOR. Minor hostilities did break out on that very day (21 October), as other Serbian forces from eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina clashed with Croatian Army elements trying to move into the vacated territory. These clashes lasted only three days, however.

UNPROFOR military observers now control and monitor this area. The success of this particular mission can be attributed to Serbia's adherence to the United Nations peacekeeping plan (the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991), which called for YPA withdrawal from Croatian territory. Additionally, the Knin authorities had no Serbian population base here with which to raise and support a militia.

The tenth UNPROFOR mission (and the fourth enlargement of its mandate)--monitoring compliance with the ban of all military flights in Bosnian airspace--had debatable results. According to Reuters (24 December

1992), there were a total of 337 military flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina since 9 October 1992, when the "no-fly zone" mission was assigned to UNPROFOR, most of them by Bosnian Serb forces.³²

The Secretary-General, in his 24 November 1992 report, claimed that "the first four weeks of the ban have produced no confirmed evidence of combat activity . . ."³³ Similarly, in a 24 December 1992 statement, Mr. Vance stated that there has been no combat activity:

In this connection, it is essential to understand the factual situation. The fact is that UNPROFOR thus far has not seen any use of fixed-wing fighter aircraft in support of combat operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the no-fly-zone resolution was adopted more than two months ago. UNPROFOR has tracked helicopters on a number of occasions and has been informed that helicopters have been used in an offensive role. This,³⁴ however, has not been confirmed by UNPROFOR.

Other reports, however, dispute these statements made by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Mr. Vance. Mr. Ivan Misic, Bosnia-Herzegovina's Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in an 18 November 1992 report, lists six specific attacks conducted by Serbian fixed-wing aircraft and three by Serbian helicopters during the period 31 October to 13 November 1992.³⁵ Likewise, reporting in the 7 November 1992 issue of Jane's Defence Weekly, Zoran Kusovac claims that in October, Serbs conducted air strikes:

Details of the Bosnian-Serb offensive in north-east Bosnia last month [October 1992] have emerged,

showing that the crack 1st (Krajina) Corps, supported by air strikes, was used to break the stalemate around Bosanski Brod, Orasje and Brcko.³⁶

Secretary Eagleburger, in his 16 December 1992 allegation on war criminals, also remarked that Bosnian Serb air forces continue to fly in defiance of the London agreements. Earlier reports on 4 December 1992 give an indication of the roles of such flights:

Some flights now being conducted appear to be used to move troops, deliver supplies and train pilots and soldiers, American intelligence reports say. The reports indicate, for example, that Serbs have been flying Yugoslav-made bombers on daily training missions out of the Bosnian Serbs' main air force base at Banja Luka northwest of Sarajevo. There are also unconfirmed intelligence reports that some flights have been used to attack ground targets.³⁷

On the one hand, it appears that UNPROFOR was able to adequately track flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO's AWACS provided UNPROFOR with an accurate technical monitoring capability. On the other hand, UNPROFOR was incapable of determining whether a small number of these flights was actually delivering ordnance. UNPROFOR did not have the observers to cover enough territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A lack of funding contributed to the shortfall in numbers of observers:

The Member States which agreed to contribute military personnel, equipment and logistic support for BHC [Bosnia and Herzegovina Command] at no cost to the United Nations have been unwilling to accept that the common cost of BHC, which they have agreed to finance, should include the costs of the military observers and United Nations civilian personnel. As a result, it has not yet been possible to deploy

adequate military observer and civilian support to
BHC.³⁸

The final UNPROFOR mission (and fifth enlargement of its mandate)--monitoring Macedonia's border areas--was approved late in the year, on 11 December 1992. Hence, it is too early to make an assessment regarding its success or failure.

To summarize, UNPROFOR's work in 1992 proved to be more of a failure than a success. Of the eleven missions assigned, UNPROFOR succeeded on only one, failed or three, attained mixed results on six, and cannot be judged on the final one due to insufficient time elapsed. Did UNPROFOR fulfill its main aim: to create the conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis? Clearly the answer is "no." Of the four sectors of the UNPAs, only one--Sector West--was fully demilitarized, and even this one was far from being peaceful or secure. On the one hand, conventional warfare did not erupt in the UNPAs of Croatia, where UNPROFOR was engaged in true peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, UNPROFOR could not stop the militia groups from committing countless acts of terrorism in these areas.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where UNPROFOR was engaged in humanitarian relief efforts, it achieved some measure of success, but again was not able to create conditions

for peace and security. In the four zones designated for convoy protection in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR was only able to afford protection in two of them. Sarajevo was no more peaceful on 31 December 1992 than it was when fighting broke out in March of that year. By year's end, UNPROFOR had suffered 300 casualties, 20 of them fatal.³⁹

From this failure in the former Yugoslavia, what lessons can be drawn for future peacekeeping operations in regional/ethnic conflict environments? Is there a formula for success? In "An Agenda for Peace," Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali provides the following guidance:

The nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. The established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the cooperation of the parties in implementing that mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States to contribute the military, police and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field;⁴⁰ and adequate financial and logistic support.

With the Yugoslav case in mind, two crucial lessons should be taken from Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's formula: essentially, his first two "conditions for success." First, a peacekeeping operation requires a clear and practicable mandate. UNPROFOR's original mandate--to create the conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the

Yugoslav crisis--with its four component missions, of which demilitarization of the UNPAs in Croatia was first and foremost, was not practicable. UNPROFOR would have had to seal all UNPA borders and disarm the populations therein, which would have meant taking sides with Croatia. The numerous enlargements of the original mandate were also not practicable, considering the great difficulties UNPROFOR was experiencing with the original mandate.

Perhaps the "watering-down" of a particular mission in the politics of multilateral negotiations through the use of the word "monitor" (eg., "monitor" compliance with the ban of all military flights in the air space of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had made that mission practicable. Yet little value could come from such a mission unless there were actual enforcement, i.e., all military flights stopped. Enforcement, though, would have meant destroying Serbian air assets if they challenged the U.N. resolution, a move for which there was no international consensus. Behind the "no-fly zone" resolution, as well as the many other resolutions and mandates pertaining to UNPROFOR, the dynamics of international politics led to some type of compromise. States with peacekeeping troops on the ground, for instance, had to consider whether enforcement would put their troops in jeopardy.

The second lesson turns to Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's second condition for success: the cooperation

of the parties in implementing that mandate. Just as this cooperation was critical to success or failure in the two past peacekeeping operations briefly mentioned in Chapter 2--the cases of the Sinai and Lebanon--it was likewise critical to the Yugoslav case. In the first place, the Serbian side--the Belgrade authorities and the Knin authorities--never did cooperate with the original peacekeeping plan to which it had agreed. In the second place, the United Nations sent UNPROFOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina and later expanded the mandate in this region without ever having established a cease-fire agreement between the three sides fighting here. The obvious lesson is that peacekeepers should only be deployed after a credible cease-fire has been established.

In a review of Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace," Sir Anthony Parson develops the following lessons for the Yugoslav Conflict:

The Yugoslav operation has been a classic case of how not to do it, from which lessons must be learnt. First, there was no attempt at preventive action before hostilities erupted. Secondly, the regional organizations and the United States tried for too long to support a unified Yugoslavia. Thirdly, the regional organization (the European Community) displayed a lamentable sense of timing in recognizing the component parts of the collapsed federation. Fourthly, there must have been a lack of coordination between the European Community (peacemakers) and the United Nations (peacekeepers) in the summer. Fifthly, a gray area has opened up between Chapter VI peacekeeping (the UN presence and elsewhere) and possible Chapter VII military enforcement to escort humanitarian convoys (Security Council resolution 770) which would presumably be

carried out by NATO or WEU forces under regional command and control. All this has created an impression of dither and muddled thinking in an admittedly extremely complex situation.

With regard to the "lamentable sense of timing," the argument was already made in Chapter 3 that the U.S. may have waited too long to recognize Slovenia and Croatia and may have been premature in its recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovian. In a different vein, however, recognition of the breakaway republics was perhaps a case of "too soon is too late": Recognition at just about any point would have been too soon in the eyes of Belgrade, yet too late in the eyes of the breakaway republics.

Parson's last statement deserves special attention. The peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia has indeed found itself enmeshed in an "extremely complex situation." One can see the same predicament facing peacekeeping operations in other contemporary regional/ethnic conflict environments. Extreme complexity has been the norm for operations in both Cambodia and Somalia. The lesson to draw from this is that it is absolutely critical to thoroughly sift through the complexity before committing a peacekeeping force: that is, to first clearly identify the causes of the conflict. As was made clear in Chapter 2, the main causes of the Yugoslav Conflict were fourfold:

1. Grievances rooted in the "nationalism cleavage" and the "economic cleavage," worsened by Serbia's

initiation of an economic war, fueled rising nationalism among five nations: Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Muslims, and Albanians.

2. By 1991, there were no conflict regulation means available to the Yugoslav Government: no credible supra-national institution or authority within Yugoslavia.

3. There was a dangerous combination of "bad borders"--Krajina--and propaganda being fed into this region by external nationalists, i.e., the Serbian nationalists in Belgrade.

4. Serbian nationalists used the military instrument to protect their interests.

5. The state's monopoly on violence collapsed with the creation and strengthening of militias in Slovenia and Croatia.

The logical follow-on to this lesson is that if an international or regional organization is to commit peacekeepers, then it must simultaneously take peacemaking measures to deal with the causes. In the Yugoslav case, that would mean taking steps to: (1) break down the cleavages/divisions and curb the spiraling nationalism; (2) establish credibility; (3) change the "bad borders" and counter the propaganda; (4) convince the Serbian nationalists not to make further use of the military instrument; and, (5) discourage regional leaders from building and using militias.

Another lesson that may be drawn from the Yugoslav case deals with war crimes. In future regional/ethnic conflict environments, it is probable that ill-intentioned ethnic leadership, rising nationalism, and propaganda

will lead to war crimes. In its numerous submissions to the U.N. Security Council relating to the violations of humanitarian law, the United States Government has included the following categories as grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention: willful killing; torture of prisoners; abuse of civilians in detention centers; deliberate attacks on non-combatants; wanton devastation and destruction of property; and, mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians.⁴² The Yugoslav Conflict is an absolutely tragic case. All sides have committed war crimes, although Serbs have been responsible for the vast majority. A few examples of these crimes are provided in Appendix D (Alleged War Crimes). Mr. Vance stressed the seriousness of the matter in his 16 December 1992 statement at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia:

We have also taken action on allegations of war crimes and other breaches of international humanitarian law. We have sought to help the Commission of Experts to bring about a forensic examination of the mass grave site at Ovcara near Vukovar and this is in train this week. Lord Owen and I believe that atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia are unacceptable, and persons guilty of war crimes should be brought to justice. We therefore recommend the establishment of an international criminal court.⁴³

Collecting allegations of war crimes, investigating war crimes, and establishing an international criminal court are certainly all in good order. However, the lesson in this matter is that the United Nations needs to develop

a strategy to prevent war crimes in this type of environment. Elements of such a strategy could include: (1) use of psychological operations (PSYOP) with the objectives of persuading combatants to conform with the Geneva Conventions and of dissuading non-combatants from supporting those committing the war crimes; (2) use of information (via radio, television, leaflets, loudspeakers, etc.) to counter ethnic propaganda and give the population an unbiased account of events; and, (3) utmost diplomatic pressure on appropriate elites to move them to forestall the perpetration of war crimes.

Besides the lessons discussed above that apply to the use of peacekeeping (and associated peacemaking) in a regional/ethnic conflict environment, other lessons pertain to the peacekeeping force itself. First of all, the peacekeeping force requires competent leadership. It would be unfair to state that the failure of UNPROFOR to accomplish its many missions means that Lieutenant-General Nambiar was incompetent. However, it is fair to state that Lieutenant-General Nambiar's support of an ad hoc escalation of missions and resources in Bosnia-Herzegovina, under conditions that were clearly not suitable for peacekeeping forces, certainly calls his competence into question.

The second lesson pertaining to the peacekeeping force is that it requires freedom of movement. This

imperative was missing in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the outset. Peacekeeping units, humanitarian convoys, and various transportation assets were often impeded by direct and indirect fires, ambushes, minefields, civilian mobs, and local authorities. In a regional/ethnic conflict environment, the local authorities and their police forces must guarantee freedom of movement for the peacekeeping force. To bring about this behavior at the local level, negotiations involving all sides to help end the fighting and responsive political leaders are the keys. If freedom of movement cannot be realized, then the peacekeepers should be withdrawn and other measures should be considered.

The third lesson applying to the peacekeeping force in a regional/ethnic conflict environment is that this force requires an appropriate intelligence capability. Currently, "the UN has no system of intelligence which will remain vital to any ability to control complex and volatile situations."⁴⁴ This deficiency was evident in the Yugoslav case. UNPROFOR had the mission to monitor compliance of the "no-fly zone" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To execute this mission, UNPROFOR relied on NATO for technical monitoring assets. However, additional intelligence systems and staffing could have further aided UNPROFOR, especially for reconnaissance of convoy routes and for monitoring Serbian military

activities. U.N. acquisition of an intelligence capability will often depend on the asset involved and how important it is to the supplying state. Besides intelligence, other combat support and combat service support are requisite in such an environment: engineer, signal/communications, transportation, medical, supply, etc. Such support can usually be drawn from a number of U.N. Member States. Competent staffs, however, are absolutely critical to coordinate and synchronize this support.

The fourth lesson pertaining to the peacekeeping force is that it requires appropriate rules of engagement. The organization that commands the peacekeeping force should be responsible for establishing these rules and reviewing them for sufficiency. When the Security Council enlarged UNPROFOR's mandate to include the protection of humanitarian convoys in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security Council wisely reviewed whether the existing rules of engagement would still be appropriate. It decided that:

UNPROFOR troops would follow normal peace-keeping rules of engagement, which authorize them to use force in self-defence, including situations in which armed persons attempt by force to prevent them from carrying out their mandate.⁴⁵

Normal peacekeeping rules, however, could not guarantee that a convoy would get through to its destination. When forced to halt by an armed group, UNPROFOR did not have the authority or means to push its way through:

So far, the Security Council has given the 6,000-man U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in Bosnia a limited mandate in protecting aid convoys. Under this mandate, the U.N. forces have not been authorized or given sufficient weapons to fight their way through roadblocks of the three warring parties.⁴⁶

Armored personnel carriers became necessary to escort the humanitarian convoys, yet they still could not guarantee that the convoys would get through.

With regard to UNPROFOR elements at Sarajevo airport and within the city coming under artillery attack, how could UNPROFOR effectively "use force in self-defence" here as well? Perhaps artillery assets with a counterfire capability would have been necessary. Hence, whereas past peacekeeping cases usually called for only light infantry, the Yugoslav case offers a different lesson. For a peacekeeping force in a regional/ethnic conflict environment, combined arms are probably necessary.

Certainly, UNPROFOR was not involved in true peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nor was it tasked to enforce the peace. It was essentially conducting humanitarian relief efforts. In this regional/ethnic conflict environment, combined arms were necessary for self-defense and for credibility as convoy escorts. The trade-off, of course, is that combined arms can make the peacekeeping force appear threatening to one side or the other. Hence, appropriate rules of engagement and strict impartiality are absolutely critical.

Based on the Yugoslav case, here, then, is a summary of lessons for future peacekeeping operations (and associated peacemaking) in a regional/ethnic conflict environment:

- (1) Clearly identify the causes of the conflict.
- (2) Take peacemaking measures to deal with those causes.
- (3) Deploy peacekeepers only after a credible cease-fire is established over the area to which they shall deploy.
- (4) Formulate a clear and practicable mandate for the peacekeeping force.
- (5) Develop a strategy to prevent war crimes.
- (6) Assign competent leadership to the peacekeeping force.
- (7) Ensure freedom of movement for the force.
- (8) Secure appropriate intelligence support.
- (9) Develop suitable rules of engagement.
- (10) Organize and deploy a combined arms team.

Having derived lessons from the Yugoslav case for future peacekeeping operations in regional/ethnic conflict environments, what lessons can be drawn for the United States? The Yugoslav case offers four key lessons for the United States. Two are "easy" lessons: they should find wide acceptance and would not be difficult to enact. The other two are "hard" lessons: many Americans may want neither to accept nor confront them.

The first "easy" lesson is that the United States needs to incorporate peacekeeping into its national security strategy. The Department of Defense recognized the growing importance of peacekeeping in its 1992 Annual Report to the President and the Congress:

The changing international security environment and renewed prominence of the United Nations have increased the scope of the U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts and widened the potential for greater U.S. participation and support for peacekeeping operations. U.S. law provides for U.S. armed forces participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces, with the cost of such participation normally borne by the United Nations. U.S. military officers have served in U.N. peacekeeping missions since 1948, but more than half of these officers are in positions created only within the last year with the formation of peacekeeping missions in Kuwait/Iraq, the Western Sahara, and Cambodia. The Defense Department also provides logistic support and planning expertise to the United Nations, and has provided assistance to other peacekeeping operations where the United Nations is not involved in the Middle East and Africa. These activities, undertaken in close cooperation with the Department of State, support U.S. foreign policy objectives for the peaceful resolution of conflict; reinforce the collective security efforts of the United States, our allies, and other U.N. member states; and enhance regional stability.⁴⁷

How should the U.S. integrate peacekeeping into its national security strategy? Should the U.S. only get involved in peacekeeping operations when its national interests are at stake? Should national interests again be the driving factor when the question is whether to undertake humanitarian relief efforts as part of a broader peacekeeping operation? National interests should probably always be the driving factor. However, the National

Security Strategy of the United States does not mention peacekeeping participation or its relation to national interests. The document's section on "Our Interests and Objectives in the 1990s" merely states that the U.S. seeks to: "strengthen international institutions like the United Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace, world order and political, economic and social progress."⁴⁸ No mention is given to peacekeeping operations in the document's Chapter V.: "Relating Means to Ends: A Defense Agenda for the 1990s." Likewise, the National Military Strategy of the United States fails to address peacekeeping.⁴⁹

However, President Bush placed new emphasis on peacekeeping operations in his remarks at the U.N. on 21 September 1992:

President Bush told U.N. members today [21 September 1992] that Washington was ready to support a greatly expanded role for peacekeeping missions and to adapt the U.S. military to better assist in such operations.⁵⁰

Perhaps these remarks will give an impetus to formulation of a definitive approach to peacekeeping as part of U.S. national security strategy.

The second "easy" lesson is that the U.S. needs to upgrade the peacekeeping doctrine and training within its armed forces. As recognized by the Department of Defense, the changing international security environment has increased the potential for greater U.S. participation

in peacekeeping operations. Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20: Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (5 December 1990) addresses Army and Air Force doctrine on peacekeeping operations. However, the brief (10-page) chapter on "Peacekeeping Operations" provides practically no information on a framework, objectives, combined arms, command and control, or security.⁵¹

Again, President Bush may have provided some stimulus for improving peacekeeping doctrine and training by way of his 21 September 1992 U.N. remarks:

Getting to what the United States was prepared to do now as an example to others, Bush said he was directing Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to make U.S. military bases, intelligence agencies and engineering units better able to take part in peacekeeping operations. He is also to establish a peacekeeping curriculum in military academies, something that already exists in Scandinavia.

"Because of peacekeeping's growing importance as a mission for the United States military, we will emphasize training of combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian activities," Mr. Bush said.⁵²

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, has since recommended changes in this direction:

In a report setting forth his vision of the military after the cold war, Gen. Colin L. Powell recommends a number of innovations, including the creation of a new command to conduct joint training of forces from the different services for intervention in regional crises. The new command could also support United Nations peacekeeping operations and oversee disaster relief operations. . . . He proposed that the United States Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Va., be upgraded to take on these missions. The name of the command might be changed, and its commander might be drawn from any of the four services. The

Atlantic Command has always been under the command of a four-star admiral.⁵³

The third lesson for the United States is a "hard" one: that the United States cannot count on Western Europe to extinguish an ethnic conflict in its own backyard. Simply put, Western Europe has been reluctant to take the moral step forward and conduct peace enforcement. Throughout the Yugoslav Conflict, the excuses for not using force to stop the Serbian aggression and "ethnic cleansing" have been abundant.

Mr. Kenney draws the same lesson as to the lethargy of Western Europe and its institutions:

The same thing applies for NATO and for CSCE. These institutions exist. If they're afraid to use force here because they could get shot at or hurt, then why have them? And if CSCE wants to talk about human rights everywhere and then doesn't deal with Yugoslavia, or worries about suspending Yugoslavia, if it can't get at the issues,⁵⁴ then it's not much more than a debating society.

Also taking this position, though not in such harsh language, is Mr. Josef Joffe, columnist and editorial page editor of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung [South German Newspaper] in Munich. He states that throughout 1992, Western Europe could not unite on the purpose of intervention--pacification--in Bosnia, since there was no compelling interest and no chance of quick and easy success: "By year's end the new Europe, so confident about mastering its own future in early 1992, had proven unable to coalesce around a single purpose."⁵⁵

In contrast to the pessimistic view of Western Europe, Mr. Michael Brenner, professor of international affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, sees a positive long-term development for the European Community:

. . . the significance of this inaugural performance is not to be found in the record of what was, or was not, accomplished in Yugoslavia alone. This unprecedented exercise at collective diplomacy marks a turning-point in the EC's evolution into a political entity managing its external affairs. The Yugoslav episode confirmed the Community in its new vocation as a player in world politics, even while exposing the limitations of its present structures and procedures. It also gave us a glimpse into the post-Maastricht era when national differences may be magnified in the very process of their resolution into a European policy. The implications of what the EC did in Yugoslavia, therefore, are potentially profound: for Community construction, for building a new continental order, and for the distribution of duties and functions within the Atlantic Alliance as well.⁵⁶

Key to the realization of this potential will be whether the EC can indeed overcome national differences and develop a common will to fulfill "its new vocation as a player in world politics."

The fourth lesson for the United States is likewise a "hard" one: In the event that an extremely nationalistic leader incites nationalism among his "nation" (as defined in Chapter 1) and supports the attack against another "nation," when U.S. national interests are also at stake, and when regional organizations fail to resolve the crisis, then the U.S. needs to take action and display leadership. In the Yugoslav Conflict, one can argue that President

Milosevic supported Serbian aggression against the Muslims, that the flow of refugees posed a threat to stability in Europe, and that regional organizations failed to resolve the conflict.

One could question why the U.S. used the military instrument of power to provide humanitarian relief in Somalia--where no national interests are at stake, although sea lines of communication that facilitate access to foreign mineral resources are in the immediate vicinity. Yet, it did not use the military instrument to threaten or pressure President Milosevic in any way in 1992 in "Yugoslavia"--which lay between Italy and Greece (two NATO countries), which threatened European stability through the flow of refugees, and which experienced the savage practice of "ethnic cleansing." One can certainly debate this lesson as well as the range of military options. Certainly, unilateral military action would not have been appropriate. With regard to the case of Somalia, one should not necessarily infer from the statement above that sea lines of communication were the basis for U.S. military intervention.

Dr. Michael G. Roskin, visiting professor at the U.S. Army War College, argues that: "Quite conceivably even the most well-intentioned military action could make things worse in Bosnia."⁵⁷ One would have to ask Dr.

Roskin what he could possibly consider worse in Bosnia than "ethnic cleansing."

Former U.S. Secretary of State George P. Schultz, in an 8 December 1992 statement, expresses fury about the "ethnic cleansing" as well as the lack of leadership on the part of the U.S.:

What does 'ethnic cleansing' mean? It goes right back to what Hitler did. And when we say, never forget, never again, what are we talking about? The Jews in Germany, and, of course, what can happen if anti-Semitism gets out of hand. But more broadly, we're saying, when forces of intolerance go wild, you get a result that is basically intolerable.

. . . I think that . . . the most difficult problem in the world today, including in the United States, is the problem of governing over diversity. One of the tragedies we see unfolding is that Sarajevo was a city where people of diverse religions and backgrounds were living in reasonable harmony. And that's been smashed. . . . Becoming involved does not necessarily mean putting troops on the ground.

. . . It involves saying to people who want to defend themselves and defend their freedom, yes, we'll help you. . . . Those are identifiable missions. They're doable missions by our Air Force and our smart weapons. . . . It seems to me, that's the kind of leadership we should be taking.

. . . as I look at it, I have⁵⁸ as I've said, a sense of fury about what's going on

Once again, the range of military options is open to debate. The lesson, though, that the U.S. needs to take action and display leadership under such circumstances deserves special attention, if not national reflection.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

How effective were U.N. peacekeeping operations in the disputed areas of "Yugoslavia" in 1992? Based upon this study, one would have to conclude that UNPROFOR was not very effective. Again, UNPROFOR's main aim was: to create the conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. By the end of 1992, UNPROFOR had not met this aim. Of the four sectors of the UNPAs in Croatia, only one--Sector West--was fully demilitarized. Even this sector was not peaceful or secure.

Of the four zones established for the protection of humanitarian convoys within Bosnia-Herzegovina, only two became relatively safe for convoy operations. Sarajevo was no more peaceful on 31 December 1992 than it was in March 1992--when UNPROFOR established a base of operations there. In fact, it became less peaceful. As discussed, however, the Yugoslav Conflict had entered a new phase in Bosnia and had become more complex, as three new parties were fighting: Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Muslims.

Of the eleven missions assigned to UNPROFOR, it succeeded on only one, failed on three, attained mixed results on six, and cannot be judged on the final one due to insufficient time elapsed. A recapitulation of these results is as follows:

MISSION	RESULTS
As of 21 February 1992:	
1. Demilitarization of UNPAs.	mixed
2. Protection of persons in UNPAs.	failure
3. Functioning of local police.	mixed
4. Return of civilian displaced persons.	failure
As of 8 June 1992:	
5. Security & relief at Sarajevo airport.	mixed
As of 30 June 1992:	
6. Restoration of authority in pink zones.	mixed
As of 7 August 1992:	
7. Control of UNPA borders.	failure
As of 14 September 1992:	
8. Protection of humanitarian convoys.	mixed
As of 6 October 1992:	
9. Demilitarization of Prevlaka Peninsula.	success
As of 9 October 1992:	
10. Monitoring of "no-fly zone."	mixed
As of 11 December 1992:	
11. Monitoring of Macedonia's border areas.	too soon

The main reason that UNPROFOR was unable to achieve success on missions 1-4, 6, and 7 in Croatia during 1992 was the Knin authorities and their Serbian militias:

Although the Croatian authorities have from time to time raised tension in the UNPA's and the "pink zones" by injudicious public statements and provocative military moves, it has to be stated clearly that responsibility for non-implementation of the peacekeeping plan approved by the Security Council rests squarely with the Knin authorities.

The main reason that UNPROFOR was unable to achieve success on missions 5 and 8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Serbian forces (led primarily by General Mladic), who received

some direction and support from Serbian President Milosevic. A reason that UNPROFOR did not achieve greater success on mission 10 was insufficient resources and will.

However, the overriding reason that UNPROFOR was not successful on the whole was: the failure of the associated peacemaking. The United Nations, and the EC for its part, made several mistakes in this endeavor. In the first place, it failed to clearly identify and address the causes of the conflict. Second, it assigned UNPROFOR an original mandate that was unrealistic, at least without parallel progress on an overall settlement. Without such progress, UNPROFOR could not be expected to demilitarize the various militia groups in the UNPAs of Croatia. Third, the U.N. kept UNPROFOR elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina without ever establishing a cease-fire over this area, where three new parties were fighting. In fact, the U.N. continued to expand the mandate and resources of UNPROFOR on an ad hoc basis in Bosnia, as well as in Croatia, without resolving this lack of a cease-fire. Hence, UNPROFOR became enmeshed in both peacekeeping operations in Croatia and humanitarian relief efforts in the war zone of Bosnia--on the basis of the one original mandate.

The Yugoslav Conflict is a peculiar case. On the one hand, it is a civil war: the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it is the Serbian

nation's clear aggression against, and even "ethnic cleansing" of, other nations. The prospect of Serbs as minorities in an independent Croatia and an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, without guaranteed rights, led to the initiation of hostilities in both instances. Because of the Serbian nation's aggression, by the end of 1992 there were estimates of 27,000 dead (one source lists 50,000 fatalities); 149,000 injured; 111,000 missing; 30-50,000 victims of rape; and, two million homeless--not to mention the countless destroyed towns of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although the Yugoslav Conflict is a peculiar case, it offers numerous lessons for future peacekeeping operations in a regional/ethnic conflict environment, along with the associated peacemaking:

- (1) Clearly identify the causes of the conflict.

- (2) Take peacemaking measures to deal with those causes. For the Yugoslav case, this meant:

- (a) Break down the cleavages/divisions and curb the spiraling nationalism.

- (b) Establish credibility.

- (c) Change the "bad borders" and counter the ethnic propaganda.

- (d) Convince the Serbian nationalists not to make further use of the military instrument.

- (e) Discourage regional leaders from building and using militias.

- (3) Deploy peacekeepers only after a credible cease-fire is established over the area to which they shall deploy.
- (4) Formulate a clear and practicable mandate for the peacekeeping force.
- (5) Develop a strategy to prevent war crimes.
- (6) Assign competent leadership to the peacekeeping force.
- (7) Ensure freedom of movement for the force.
- (8) Secure appropriate intelligence support.
- (9) Develop suitable rules of engagement.
- (10) Organize and deploy a combined arms team, with careful consideration of the needs for self-defense, credibility as convoy escorts, and impartiality.

Additionally, the Yugoslav case offers four key lessons to the United States, of which the first two should be relatively easy to accept and address, but the latter two may be more difficult for some to acknowledge and confront:

- (1) The United States needs to incorporate peacekeeping into its national security strategy.
- (2) The U.S. needs to upgrade the peacekeeping doctrine and training within its armed forces.
- (3) The U.S. cannot yet count on Western Europe to extinguish a conflict in its own backyard.
- (4) The U.S. needs to take action and display leadership when such a set of circumstances occurs: nationalist aggression, U.S. national interests at stake, and a failure of regional organizations to resolve the crisis.

Peacekeeping, however, was the focus of this study. UNPROFOR was not very effective in the Yugoslav case,

at least not in fulfilling its main aim. This case was certainly complex and afforded no easy answers or missions. The United Nations, though, made too many mistakes: failing to identify and address the causes of the conflict, assigning UNPROFOR an unrealistic mandate, and failing to achieve a cease-fire and cooperation among the three sides fighting over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

If the United States wants the United Nations to be effective in future peacekeeping operations, the U.S. should first incorporate peacekeeping into its national security strategy. Then, it should address shortfalls in both peacekeeping doctrine and training within its armed forces. Only then would the U.S. be in a position to provide the U.N. with the expertise on peacekeeping that it so critically needs.

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EPILOGUE

Since the ending date of this analysis (31 December 1992), UNPROFOR has persevered in its peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts, yet peace and security have proven elusive in the midst of both positive and negative developments. On 22 January 1993, the Croatian Army violated the fundamental peace agreement, negotiated by Mr. Vance in November 1991, by conducting an offensive in the Krajina UNPA near the port of Zadar and the Peruca Dam. Clashes continued in this area until mid-February.

On 11 February 1993, Bosnia's Muslim-led government refused to accept relief supplies in Sarajevo, demanding that the U.N. first ensure aid deliveries to beleaguered Muslim communities in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. In turn, the U.N. suspended relief efforts in Sarajevo on 13 February, but resumed these efforts just six days later. On 28 February, the United States, having received endorsement from the U.N., began an airdrop of supplies to isolated civilians in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 24 March, Germany joined the U.S. in this operation.

All the while, the Serbs continued their "ethnic cleansing" operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and repeatedly

obstructed humanitarian aid convoys. The town of Cerska fell to the Serbs on 3 March, and Konjevic Polje fell on 15 March. In spite of obstacles, UNPROFOR was able to get some convoys through to areas with starving civilians. In late March, fighting erupted once again between Croats and Serbs near Zadar, and around Dubrovnik as well, but this fighting soon tapered off.

On 25 March, Bosnia's Muslim-led government signed on to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, previously endorsed by the Bosnian Croats. This plan, which calls for the establishment of ten semi-autonomous provinces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, does not resolve the problem of "bad borders" in Bosnia or Croatia. Nor does it resolve the plight of the Albanians in Kosovo. Hence, lasting peace for "Yugoslavia" is not assured. On 26 March, Serbian leaders agreed to a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thanks mainly to the valiant efforts of Lieutenant-General Philippe Morillon of France, the Commander of the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sporadic clashes, however, continued.

On 1 April, the U.N. Security Council authorized NATO to enforce the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia. NATO began enforcement on 12 April. On this same date, Bosnian Serb forces resumed their shelling of Srebrenica and Sarajevo. On 18 April, after the establishment of a truce between Serbs and Muslims over the fighting at Srebrenica, a

company of Canadian peacekeepers entered this town to set up a "safe haven."

Meanwhile, Croats and Muslims were fighting each other in central Bosnia during the period 15-22 April.

On 26 April, Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb "legislature" considered and rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. They also demanded the withdrawal of the Canadian company from Srebrenica. On 27 April, the U.N. implemented tougher sanctions against "Yugoslavia" (Serbia-Montenegro). On 28 April, certain U.S. generals responded to questions on the effectiveness of airstrikes before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.

On 1 May, a new round of peace talks began in Athens. Under pressure from Serbian President Milosevic, Mr. Karadzic signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan on 2 May. However, on 5 May, the Bosnian Serb assembly voted not to approve the plan and to instead hold a 15-16 May referendum among Bosnian Serbs to decide its course.

On 6 May, Serbia's government announced that it would cut off support to the Bosnian Serbs. On this date, President Clinton stated that the U.S. and its allies should implement tougher measures to stop Serbian aggression. Since 3 May, Secretary of State Christopher had been in Europe discussing possible military steps with allies.

On 7 May, Bosnian Serbs resumed their shelling of Zepa, declared a "safe haven" along with five other towns the day prior by the U.N. Security Council. On 8 May, however, Lt.-Gen. Morillon was able to reach an agreement between Bosnian Serb and Muslim military leaders on the enforcement of the "safe haven" around Zepa. A company of Ukrainian peacekeepers is to enter the town on 9 May. One can expect UNPROFOR to pursue similar agreements for the other towns designated as "safe havens."

The various developments throughout 1993 do not affect the conclusions of this thesis. Although UNPROFOR's work has been most commendable, it was not very effective in 1992 (and beyond) in fulfilling its main aim, evidenced by the ever-present lack of peace and security throughout the disputed areas of "Yugoslavia." The lack of success can be attributed to the many reasons cited in Chapters 4 and 5.

APPENDIX A
ECONOMIC TABLES


Table 1. Regional Economic Disparities in Yugoslavia, 1975 (Gross social product per capita in equivalent U.S. dollars)

Slovenia	2782
Croatia	1700
Vojvodina	1651
(YUGOSLAVIA AVG	1372)
<u>Serbia proper</u>	<u>1259</u>
Montenegro	961
Macedonia	955
Bosnia-Herzegovina	944
Kosovo	453

Table 2. Net Personal Income by Republic
(In new dinars)²

	Average income over 12 months		
	1968	1973	1978
Slovenia	997	2242	5903
Croatia	904	2083	5432
(YUGOSLAVIA AVG	862	1938	5075)
Serbia proper	845	1831	4937
<u>Vojvodina</u>	<u>797</u>	<u>1871</u>	<u>4904</u>
Bosnia-Herzegovina	797	1863	4671
Montenegro	766	1689	4404
Macedonia	750	1647	4220
Kosovo	749	1617	4084

APPENDIX B
 DIAGRAM OF YUGOSLAVIA'S CLEAVAGES



Key


"Nationalism cleavage": Serbian areas shown as  .

"Economic cleavage": Poorer South is left blank.

"Religious cleavages": Catholic areas shown as  .

Muslim areas designated by *.

APPENDIX C



APPENDIX D

ALLEGED WAR CRIMES

According to the head of the Islamic community in Zagreb, 200 mosques were destroyed and another 300 damaged between April and late July [1992]. The Bosnian Institute in Zurich [Switzerland] estimated that, in areas of Serb occupation, 90 percent of the mosques have been destroyed.

About 3,000 men, women and children were killed during May and June [1992] at the Luka-Brcko camp, which held approximately 1,000 civilian internees at any one time. Some 95 per cent were ethnic Muslims and the remainder were Croatsians. Approximately 95 per cent were men. Until May the bodies were dumped in the Sava River. Thereafter, they were transported to and burned in both the old and new "kafilarija" factories located in the vicinity of Brcko.

Stores and restaurants were still burning in Prozor on 29 October [1992] following a Croatian offensive, in an apparent attempt to overtake western Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Come on boys, let's get the filthy Muslims!" shouted Croatian fighters through megaphones. Croatian Mayor Jozic estimated that 6 Muslims died and 68 were wounded during the attack, but sources in Sarajevo estimated that at least 300 Muslims were killed or wounded.

Muslims from Kamenica reportedly killed more than 60 Serb civilians and soldiers in Serbian villages near Milici from 24 to 26 September [1992].

Now, on top of documented cases of systematic torture and murder in Bosnia, come charges of a new Serb atrocity--mass rape. No one knows how many victims there are, though estimates range from 30,000 to 50,000 women, most of them Muslim. In the last few months, a torrent of wrenching first-person testimonies from refugees has emerged, suggesting widespread sexual abuse by Serb forces.

APPENDIX E

SELECTED PERSONALITIES

Boutros Boutros-Ghali	U.N. Secretary-General.
Cyrus Vance	Secretary-General's Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia.
Lt.-Gen. Satish Nambiar	UNPROFOR Commander.
Lord Owen	(EC) Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.
George Bush	U.S. President.
James Baker	U.S. Secretary of State.
Lawrence Eagleburger	U.S. Secretary of State.
*Slobodan Milosevic	President of Serbia.
Dobrica Cosic	President of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Supreme Commander of the Yugoslav Army.
Milan Panic	Prime Minister of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro), who received "no confidence" vote from federal government on 22 December 1992.
*Radovan Karadzic	"President" of "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Milan Martic	"Interior Minister" of the Knin authorities.
Gen. Zivota Panic	Chief of Yugoslav Army.
*Gen. Ratko Mladic	Commander of the Army of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

***Vojislav Seselj**

Leader of the Chetniks, a
Serbian paramilitary group.

***Zeljko Raznjatovic**

Leader of a Serbian paramilitary
force called the "Tigers,"
who also won a legislative
seat in Pristina, Kosovo in
the December 1992 elections,
which were boycotted by Kosovo's
Albanians.

Franjo Tudjman

President of Croatia.

Alija Izetbegovic

President of Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Muslim).

***denotes among ten individuals named for war crimes by
U.S. Secretary of State Eagleburger.**

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